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US Multinational Firms: 
Evidence from the Asian Turmoil 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the relation between changes in exchange rates and stock 
prices of multinational corporations. Different from previous studies on exchange rate 
exposure, I consider the relation between exchange rate variability and volatility of 
stock returns. Based on a sample of 129 U.S. multinationals with sales in Asia, the 
impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on the riskiness of multinational firms before 
and after the 1997 Asian Financial Turmoil are studied. Empirical findings indicate 
that increases in exchange rate variability during the crisis are associated with 
statistically significant increases in stock return volatility for the sample firms. This 
increase in volatility is more eminent when compared with the control firms. I fiirther 
illustrate that some of the increases in stock return volatility are systematic in nature. 
Market risk as a whole, measured by firms' beta coefficients, rises in the period of 
increased exchange rate variability. 
JEL classification: F3 
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著眼於匯率的波動率與股票價格變動率之間的關係。樣本企業爲 1 2 9家 
在亞洲區有銷售的美國跨國企業，同時，另外選取了 1 2 9家在亞洲區沒 
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The past five decades have witnessed the flourish of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and the increasing attempts by host countries to attract foreign 
direct investments (FDI). According to United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development's (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2000, world FDI inflows in 
1999 was $865 billion. The ratio of world FDI to global gross domestic capital 
formation is now 14 percent, compared with two percent twenty years before. At the 
same time, the number of MNCs in 15 developed home countries increased from 
some 7,000 at the end of the 1960s to over 40,000 at the end of the 1990s. As a result 
their international operations, these MNCs have additional opportunities that are not 
open to domestic corporations (DCs). However, the dynamics of MNCs' international 
business environments expose them to additional economic forces. For example, 
MNCs may have greater exposures to country risk, and their performance may be 
affected by exchange rate fluctuations. 
Country risk (also referred to as environmental or international political risk) 
incorporates all the risk elements that influence the host country's political, economic, 
and social environments. These factors include the transparency and stability of the 
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host country's governmental actions pertaining to capital repatriation, currency 
blockage or expropriation, credit, equity ownership restrictions, legal requirements, 
tax codes, laws for protection of patents, local personnel and product usage, 
bureaucratic procedures, etc. Country risk can originate from factors which are 
exogenous to a country (such as the collapse of external markets for its key exports), 
or endogenous (such as a change in political dominant parties or economic policies), 
or an interaction of both (e.g., Lessard, 1989; Mahajan, 1990; Pan and Li, 2000). 
Furthermore, there could be systematic differences in agency costs faced by MNCs 
and DCs. Monitoring their overseas agents and managers is harder for MNCs because 
of geographical constraints, cultural differences, timing issues, so on and so forth (see, 
e.g., Lee and Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996; Reeb, Kwok, and Baek, 1998). When a 
major political event occurs, the impacts on a corporation can be severe. Thus, 
monitoring the country risk is essential when MNCs makes the foreign investment 
decisions. 
The other risk, which is the topic of a growing literature and is also the theme 
of this study, is the risk resulting from the dynamic foreign exchange rate innovations. 
It is a common belief that exchange rate changes will affect values of firms with 
foreign operations (e.g., Heckerman, 1972; Adler and Dumas, 1984; Flood and 
Lessard, 1986). Currency fluctuations can have dramatic impacts on the performance 
and competitiveness of multinational firms. From the sourcing and marketing 
perspectives, exchange rate movement affects both the prices and the quantities of 
inputs and outputs. Consequently, basic costs and revenues structures of MNCs are 
changed. Hence, it causes the cash flow patterns of the MNCs and their competitors to 
be altered; and finally, creates a competitive advantage or disadvantage. It could lead 
to increased (decreased) revenue for a multinational firm when foreign currencies 
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appreciate (depreciate) as domestically produced goods and services become 
relatively less (more) expensive. Following this argument, alternatively, it could 
induce increased (decreased) costs as foreign currencies appreciate (depreciate), since 
foreign-sourced inputs and foreign-denominated debt become relatively more (less) 
expensive. As a result, current and future cash flows, hence market values of firms 
will change. 
Some examples can help to illustrate this point further. For instance, in the 
early 1980s, the US dollar appreciated against the Japanese yen. The average value of 
the yen in 1980 was ¥250 per US dollar. This depreciation of the Japanese yen 
boosted the competitive positions of Japanese carmakers at the expense of US 
automobile manufacturers. As a result, Japanese carmakers gained market share and 
profitability even in the highly competitive US market. However, in the mid-eighties, 
the US dollar substantially depreciated against the yen. In 1986, the yen appreciated 
about 30% from 1985. In 1988, the value of yen became ¥125 per US dollar. In other 
words, the yen appreciated 50% between 1980 and 1988. It forced Japanese 
carmakers to raise dollar prices of their cars by more than their US competitors do. 
That is to say, if all other factors were the same, a ¥2,500,000 Japanese car in the US 
market would cost $10,000 in 1980. However, the price would be $20,000 in 1988, 
even though a US auto could maintain $10,000. This change in the exchange rate had 
significant economic consequences for both US and Japanese firms. For Japanese 
exporters, it is a big disadvantage. Honda estimates that for every one-yen rise against 
the US dollar, the company loses $60 million in export sales (Hara, 1994). The same 
change in exchange rate, however, tended to strengthen the competitive position of 
US carmakers, who were competing with the imported products from Japan. Facing 
the strong yen，some of Japan's carmakers shifted their production plants into US to 
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lower the cost and to serve the American markets. In 1995, Elliot, executive vice 
president of American Honda Motor Co., said that Honda's price increases were held 
down by the fact that 70% of the Honda were built in the US (Automotive News, 
April 17 1995, p6). 
The above situations show that exchange rate changes can have great impacts 
on multinational firms' operations. It is important to stress that not only MNCs have 
exposure in foreign exchange. As noted in Black (1990), all firms face foreign 
exchange exposure in one form or another. Nevertheless, as firms go international, 
their exchange rate exposure will definitely increase. 
This “exchange rate — firm value" phenomenon motivates researchers to study 
and measure the economic exposure (hereafter to be referred as exposure in the thesis), 
which is defined as the effect of unanticipated exchange rate changes on the cash 
flows and the value of the firm. Previous empirical studies used trade-weighted 
indices of nominal or real foreign exchange rates as proxies for value of the dollar, 
and examine the relation between exchange rate fluctuations and stock returns of large 
multinational firms, exporters, and manufacturing industries. However, empirical 
findings of these studies are inconclusive. Some studies find limited evidence of a 
relation between firm value and contemporaneous changes in the dollar exchange rate 
(e.g.，Jorion, 1990, 1991; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; Amihud, 1994; Bartov and 
Bodnar，1994; He and Ng, 1998). More recent studies (e.g., Choi and Prasad, 1995; 
Donnelly and Sheehy, 1996; Miller and Reuer, 1998; Gao, 2000; Glaum, Brunner, 
and Himmel, 2000); nevertheless, find somewhat stronger evidence of exchange rate 
exposures. To summarize, the overall evidence on exposure still remains weak. 
Bartov and Bodnar (1994) attribute the limited evidence on exchange rate 
exposure to drawbacks in the sample selection procedures used in previous studies, as 
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well as investors' mispricing in the estimation of the exposure. In accordance with 
this explanation, Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997a, b) find significant exposures for 
horizons longer than six months. However, He and Ng (1998) find that about 25 
percent of 171 Japanese multinationals experienced economically significant positive 
exposure effect but no lagged effect during the period 1979 to 1993. 
1.2 Objectives and Motivation 
This study is another effort to provide empirical evidence on the sensitivity of 
the value of multinational firms to exchange rate movements by exploiting firm-level 
data. Although the topic has been explored extensively in the literature, this piece of 
work contributes to the economic exposure literature in the following ways. 
Firstly, I summarize and analyze the conceptual and technical problems 
associated with previous studies on the modeling and estimation of economic 
exposure. Following Adler and Dumas (1984)，extant literature measure the exposure 
as the sensitivity of the value of the firm to random variations in future exchange rate. 
Empirically, this exposure sensitivity is obtained from a regression of stock returns on 
exchange rate changes, often with additional control variables such as the return of the 
market portfolio. However, the potential deficits in the measurement model could 
result in statistical insignificant results and lead to the conclusion of no exposure 
effects. 
Secondly, the limitations of the extant measurement model and the unsolved 
issue on exchange rate exposure motivate me to focus on another dimension on the 
issue of economic exposure. Rather than calculating the foreign exchange exposure 
itself’ I consider the possibility of impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on the cost of 
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capital rather than on the value of the firm. A study by Bartov, Bodnar, and Kaul 
(1996) (hereafter referred to be BBK) demonstrates that there is an increase in the 
variability of stock returns following the change from fixed exchange rate 
arrangement (the Bretton Woods System) to a floating regime. Motivated by BBK, I 
consider the impacts of increased exchange rate variability on the stock return 
volatility of US multinational firms by focusing on the period around the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. The examination of the link between exchange rate change and stock 
return variability, as measured by the second moment, the variance ( a ) , provides 
another interesting area for investigating the impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on 
the stock return behaviors of multinational firms. Focusing exposure on the second 
moment has some advantages over previous studies that use the first moment (return) 
in understanding the relation between exchange rates and stock returns. More detailed 
explanations will be contained in the next chapter. 
Thirdly, I explore how the Asian Financial Crisis affects the sensitivity of US 
multinational firms to the US stock market risk. I decompose the impacts of increased 
exchange rate variability on the stock return volatility of multinational firms into two 
components: systematic and unsystematic risk. The systematic risk of multinational 
firms is the focus of this study because understanding the level of systematic risk in 
the multinational firms is important in pricing equity, determining the cost of capital, 
and evaluating investment projects. 
The rationale for this investigation on systematic risk follows from corporate 
finance theory that investors can diversify all risk except the risk of the economy as a 
whole. Within the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), systematic 
risk is measured by beta coefficient estimated by the market model of the following 
form: Rj = ccj + P] Rm + s�,in which Rj is the return on firm j, R^ is the return on the 
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market portfolio and s�is the error term. Under this model，return on any asset is a 
linear function of market return plus a random error. The total risk of the asset is 
calculated as the variance on both sides of the mathematical equation, and is 
decomposed into the systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is measured by 
the beta coefficient and is defined as the risk that is subject to overall market 
movement. The unsystematic risk is variance of the residual part in the regression 
model. Theoretically, unsystematic risk is diversifiable and can be eliminated by 
distributing assets among a variety of asset classes, such as stocks, bonds, money 
market instruments, and physical commodities, as well as by diversifying within these 
categories and across international boundaries. When compared with unsystematic 
risk, systematic risk is inherent in the market and this kind of risk can only be hedged 
and cannot be diversified. 
A large body of literature in the area of systematic risk and internationalization 
indicates that MNCs benefit in reduction of systematic risk from international 
diversification. It is because shareholders possess cash flows in imperfectly correlated 
markets, and that firms' betas are negatively related to their degree of international 
involvements (e.g., Hughes, Loge and Sweeney, 1975; Rugman, 1976; Agmon and 
Lessard, 1977; Fatemi, 1984; Michel and Shaked, 1986). This conclusion is consistent 
with the diversification theory and is similar to the diversification argument for the 
inclusion of foreign firms in an investor's well-diversified portfolio. Jorion (1991) 
also argues that US investors do not appear to price foreign exchange risk. Therefore, 
foreign exchange risk can be diversified away as well, and will not affect firms' costs 
of capital. 
BBK, however, document that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System is 
associated with an increase in systematic risk for US multinational firms. In this study, 
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I also try to examine separately the impacts on systematic risk and unsystematic risk. 
This decomposition has important implications for the impact of exchange rate 
variability on the expected rate of return of multinational firms. The 
internationalization of security markets has enabled firms to seek and obtain 
alternative sources of capital worldwide. However, if the firm's beta rises, investors 
require higher excess returns for holding its stock. This in turn will raise the firm's 
cost of equity capital. Thus, firms that saw their betas rise as a result of the Asian 
Financial Crisis would face higher costs of equity. Therefore, determining if the 
increase of foreign exchange fluctuation has effects on the firms' cost of capital will 
provide firms with practical implications. This job is to be conducted in Chapter IV. 
The fourth effort of this study is to apply “option theoretic interpretation of the 
firm” to understand the nature of the relationship between exchange rates and stock 
prices. Emmons and Schmid (2000) find that firms' earnings growth remained flat 
while the stock returns went up during the Asian financial crisis. They introduce 
"option theoretic interpretation of the firm" to explain this phenomenon. I follow their 
conjecture to study the impact of a volatile exchange rate fluctuation on the value of 
firms. Option Pricing Theory (hereafter referred to be OPT) posits that equity in a 
levered firm is in fact a call option on the value of the firm with the underlying asset 
of the option being market value of the firm. When return of the underlying asset 
becomes more volatile, the option is more valuable. It is because holders of the call 
option can receive the payoffs from the upside while they will not suffer the loss for 
the downside; thus, shareholders will prefer more risk to less. This application of the 
option pricing theory into corporate finance provides many insights into the 
determination of the stock price of the multinational firms while taking exchange rate 
fluctuation into account. According to the OPT, when the systematic risk of the US 
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multinational firms increases in conjunction with the Asian Financial Crisis, returns 
on the stocks increase as well. This explanation is further illustrated in Chapter IV. 
1.3 The Asian Crisis 
In this study, I investigate whether the economic situation in Asia is related to 
changes in US multinational firms' betas by focusing on the period around the Asian 
financial crisis. This period is of interest for several reasons. 
First, the year 1997 started a wave of currency collapses and economic 
upheavals in Asia. Starting with the fall of the Baht in Thailand on July 2, 1997，the 
Philippines (July 11), Malaysia (July 14), Indonesia (August 14), and Korea 
(November 17) were all forced to abandon their systems of pegged exchange rates. 
Table 1 provides the chronological details of this financial crisis. The change from a 
highly stable exchange rate regime to a floating regime of currencies was associated 
with the corresponding sharp increase in exchange rate variability. Within one year, 
the value of the currency of each of these nations nearly halved (Figure 1). 
Second, the financial crisis results in an increase in the observed volatility of 
financial markets and capital flows around the world. Figure 2 shows the sustained 
increase in stock market volatility that occurred in the United States throughout 1997-
98. Despite the financial chaos in Asia, Wall Street had another good year. ‘‘…[T]he 
Dow Jones industrial average rose 23% through December 30th’ despite a drop in the 
s卿nd half of the year. After peaking at 8,259 in August, it closed at 7,916. European 
bourses also boomed — Morgan Stanley's European share-price index rose 
22.4%…，\The Economist, January 3rd 1998). In addition, capital flows to emerging 
1 0 
TABLE 1 
CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS OF THE ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS 
Date Event 
July 2, 1997 The Bank of Thailand announces a managed float of the 
Baht. The announcement effectively devalues the Baht by 
about 15-20 percent. This is the trigger for the East Asian 
crisis. 
July 14, 1997 The Malaysian central bank, Bank Negara, abandons the 
defense of the Ringgit. 
July 17, 1997 The Singapore Monetary Authority allows the depreciation 
of the Singapore Dollar. 
August 14, 1997 Indonesia abolishes its system of a managed exchange rate 
through the use of a band and allows the Rupiah to float. 
October 14, 1997 Vietnam, bowing to months of pressure on its currency 
Dong, doubles the permitted trading range to 10 percent 
either side of the daily official rate. 
October 18，1997 The Central Bank of China allows the New Taiwan Dollar to 
fall, giving up defending the currency at about NTD 
28.6/USD, which lasted for two and a half months. 
November 17, 1997 South Korea abandons its defense of the Won sending the 
currency plunging through the 1,000/dollar level. 
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(VIX) 
4 
markets collapsed (Table 2) while portfolio investments into the US and other 
industrialized countries increased. These movements in capital flows may partly 
explain the increase in US and European stock market indexes during this period 
despite the increase in uncertainty about global economic growth and increased 
financial market volatility. 
Third, the crisis has spread throughout Asia quickly with a marked impact on 
both local and global economies (Table 3 and Table 4). Worldwide economic growth 
slowed, risk premiums in debt markets increased, stock markets became more volatile, 
and confidence indicators fell in many countries. This crisis has raised a variety of 
questions not only about the future of the region's economy, but also about the impact 
of the crisis on multinational companies and the world economy, including the US 
economy. 
Fourth, several previous studies (e.g., He and Ng，1998) point out that the little 
evidence on the foreign exchange exposure of multinational firms is due to the 
hedging activities of firms. However, the possibility for firms to hedge to totally 
eliminate the risk for the Asian financial crisis became much smaller. This is because 
most of the Asian countries adopted pegged exchange rate arrangements before the 
Asian financial crisis. Since their currency values were relatively stable, there was 
less need to hedge. Therefore, the choice of this time period may reduce the impacts 
of hedging activities by multinational firms that could reduce the observed impacts of 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.4 Procedures and Findings 
The sample firms in this study are US multinationals with reported sales in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The firms are chosen because their cash flows are directly 
influenced by exchange rate fluctuations in Asia, which is a result of the change in the 
exchange rate regime in some Asian nations during the crisis. Moreover, I use the 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes and market capitalization as the criteria 
to create a control sample of size-matched multinational firms in the same line of 
business but without reported sales to Asian customers. Therefore, I perform the tests 
for impacts of the exchange rate variability while controlling for the impacts of other 
possible confounding influences related to firm size and other factors. 
The tests cover a three-year period from January 1996 to December 1998. The 
analysis begins by separating the study period into two sub-periods before and after 
early July 1997 and calculating the variance of weekly returns for each firm during 
the two sub-periods. 
Although most previous studies use monthly data to capture the exchange rate 
exposure, I use weekly data in my analysis for the following reasons. First, monthly 
data can be treated as long-term effect, however, I want a broad measure for short-
term effect of the market. Second, as mentioned before, I divide my research period 
into two sub-periods, each is about one and half year in length. The use of weekly 
data enables us to have enough observations to perform the regression analysis. The 
choice of data frequency is also a tradeoff between information content and noise. 
Although data of higher frequency can provide a larger set of data, the estimation of 
the coefficients may be imprecise since there is more noise imbedded. Hence, it is 
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possible that the estimated coefficients are small relative to their standard errors. We 
may get the results that are statistically significant but economically insignificant. 
Given above conjectures and using US multinational firms as my samples, I 
find that the increase in exchange rate variability during the Asian crisis is associated 
with a statistically significant increase in stock return volatility for sample firms 
compared with the control firms. 
I then estimate a single-factor market model of each firm's weekly excess 
stock returns during the window period. In the market model, I allow the beta to 
change, and show that for the group of sample firms, the beta in the second sub-period 
is larger than that of in the first sub-period. Consistent with BBK (1996), this result 
indicates that some portions of the increased stock return volatility of the 
multinational firms is systematic in nature, as the market risk (beta) of these firms 
rises significantly in the period of increased exchange rate variability. Hence, market 
risk is positively related to exchange rate variability. Firms with exposures in Asian 
currencies have increase in both their risk and cost of capital. 
In this study, I also examine the pattern of change in earnings per share during 
the research period. The low growth rate of corporate earnings demonstrates that 
increased market risk, rather than higher expected earnings, boosts the stock returns 
during the Asian crisis. This is consistent with "option theoretic interpretation of the 
firm” applied in the context of a volatile exchange rate environment. I interpret this 
evidence as suggesting that increasing exchange rate variability leads to greater stock 
price variability of multinational firms and that investors' perceived increase in 
business risk could be responsible for high stock returns. As a result, the additional 




Empirical analyses from previous studies have shown mixed results on the 
economic exposure theory. This study takes a different approach to deal with this 
paradox of exposure by focusing on the relationship between exchange change rate 
variability and the stock return volatility. 
The findings in this study add to the existing literature on the link between 
unanticipated exchange rate movements and stock return of multinational firms. 
Empirical results suggest that firms' stock return volatility increases corresponding to 
the rise in exchange rate variability. In addition, evidence here suggests that part of 
such an increase in stock return volatility is systematic in nature. Thus, it is 
conceivable that exchange rate fluctuations will affect market risk of firms with 
exposure to the source of the risk. Overall, this study furthers the understanding of 
foreign exchange rate exposure, the dynamics of market risk, as well as cost of equity 
for multinational firms under volatile exchange rate fluctuations. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II contains a brief 
review of previous studies. In particular, I discuss the relevant literature and relate 
them to current study. Hypotheses, research design, the construction of the samples, 
as well as a description of data are contained in Chapter III. Empirical findings, along 
with discussions and interpretations, are presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V 




The objective of this chapter is to give an account of the conceptual, 
theoretical, and empirical developments in the economic exposure literature. As 
discussed in Chapter I, economic exposure, which is concerned with the effects of 
exchange rate fluctuations on the performances of firms with foreign operations, is of 
utmost importance in managing a firm's international operations. There has been an 
enormous growth in both the literatures of management and financial economics on 
this topic for the last two decades. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 explore the conceptual issues 
of exchange rate exposure. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 consider empirical aspects of this 
exposure and point out some shortcomings of previous studies. Section 2.5 presents a 
summary of this review. 
2.1 Definition and Determinants 
Exposure is different from risk. In standard finance paradigms, risk is defined 
as variability of returns，but exposure is not the same as risk. As pointed out by Adler 
and Dumas (1984), currency risk represents random and unanticipated changes in 
exchange rates while exposure is defined as what is at risk. Therefore, changes in the 
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exchange rates may not always affect the firm's position. In their paper, Adler and 
Dumas define exposures as "... [t]he amounts of foreign currencies which represent 
the sensitivity of the future, real domestic-currency (market) value of any physical or 
financial asset to random variations in the future domestic purchasing powers of these 
foreign currencies, at some specific future date." Fundamentally, exposures focus on 
the future impacts of exchange rate changes on asset values; while risk focuses on the 
uncertainty of future outcomes. In other words, exposure is related to change in firm 
value, while risk is related to uncertainty of firm's common stock returns. 
Eun and Resnick (2000) classify exposures into three categories: operating 
exposure, transaction exposure, and translation exposure (Table 5). Operating in an 
international business environment, the value of current and future cash flows of a 
firm depends on the relative import and export prices to the firm's foreign competitors, 
and will change when the relative prices change. If the change in relative prices is 
brought about by an exchange rate shock, the associated change in the value of 
operating cash flows is referred as “operating exposure." It is also called “economic，，， 
“real,” or “competitive，，exposure. It is different from the “contractual，，or 
"transaction" exposure of contracts denominated in a particular currency, which is a 
short-term exposure only. Transaction exposure arises from the required conversion 
from foreign to local currency to report and consolidate a firm's financial statements. 
In earlier studies on exchange rate exposure, studies have been done that deal 
with accounting techniques. Later research attention has been changed to causes of 
exposure and a number of theoretical papers investigate the possible sources of 
exposure. Shapiro (1975) is one of these earlier studies that focus on exchange rate 
exposure from a finance point of view instead of accounting techniques. Using 
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TABLE 5 
DEFINITION OF EXPOSURE 
Definition 
Economic exposure Arises because exchange rate changes alter the 
(Real/competitive exposure) firm's competitive position in the world market and 
thus on its cash flows and market value. 
Transaction exposure Occurs from changes in the value of foreign 
(Contractual exposure) currency contracts as a result of exchange rate 
changes. 
Translation exposure Arises when reporting and consolidating financial 
(Accounting exposure) statements requires conversion from local currencies 
to home currency. 
Source: Eun and Resnick (2000). 
(广 
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a two-country equilibrium model, Shapiro (1975) examines the profitability issue of 
multinational corporations under an exchange rate or inflation shock. Theoretically, 
Shapiro (1975) shows that exposure exists and concludes that a multinational firm's 
exchange rate exposure is determined by the distribution of its sales between domestic 
and foreign markets, the amount of import competition it faces, and the degree of 
substitutability between local and imported materials for production. 
Heckerman (1972) and Luehrman (1990) also focus on exposure in terms of 
the traditional paradigms of corporate finance theories. Heckerman (1972) uses the 
Present Discount Value (PDV) approach and derives the effect of changes in prices 
upon the value of a foreign operation. He shows that the fluctuations in the terms of 
trade may lead to capital gains or losses. Luehrman (1990) considers a “two countries-
two firms" situation. In his model, he examines demand shifts and the behaviour of 
competitors in response to foreign exchange rate movements. He shows that exposure 
is both associated with exchange rate-induced demand shifts and competitors' re-
optimization following the exchange rate shocks. 
Apart from these studies, Levi (1994) uses an analytical approach in 
microeconomics and provides a checklist of the factors that influence exposure. Based 
on exporting and importing firms, he illustrates that the elasticity on demand for a 
product as well as the profitability of operations affects the magnitude of exposure. 
To conclude, theoretical developments in the exposure literature indicate that 
export-oriented firms and those facing import competition will benefit from a 
depreciation of their home currency. Hence, the importance of exposure is well 
documented theoretically. 
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2.2 Measurement Model 
Realizing the importance of exposure, research goes further by establishing 
the measurement model to examine the sign and magnitude of exposure. As pointed 
out in Hodder (1982), the relationship between the firm's real rate of return and 
exchange rate movements is stochastic. It is because the exchange rate movements are 
unanticipated; therefore, a probabilistic measure of exposure is needed. 
Adler and Dumas (1984) solve this problem in a statistical way. They propose 
that economic exposure to exchange rate movements is actually the regression 
coefficient of the real value of the firm on the exchange rate across states of nature. 
From a US investor's point of view, when assuming domestic inflation is nonrandom, 
the exposure is measured by the slope coefficient of a linear regression of the dollar 
value of the firm on the exchange rate. Conceptually, exposure can be treated as a 
(portfolio of) foreign currency deposit(s). Statistically, the exposure of a risky asset 
can be measured by the coefficient b, in a linear regression ofP on S across the states 
of nature such as: 
P = a + + ^, (1) 
where P is the home currency denominated price of the asset, ^ is the exchange rate, a 
is the constant term, and s is the random error term such that E(s) = c o v � s , ^ = 0. 
This specification means that the random fluctuation is not correlated with the 
underlying asset. Then the exposure of a firm to exchange rate movements can be 
estimated from the time series regression: 
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where po is a constant term, Rt is the rate of return on the company's common stock in 
period t, Rst is the contemporaneous rate of return on the exchange rates, measured as 
the US dollar price of the foreign currency, and St is an error term. 
From Equation (2), the coefficient Pi, the slope coefficient of the regression, 
represents the exchange rate exposure measure because it describes the sensitivity of 
stock returns to unanticipated changes in exchange rates. If the exchange rate is 
quoted as US dollar per unit of the foreign currency, a positive value of Pi suggests 
that a depreciation of the US dollar against other foreign currencies corresponds to an 
increase in the value of firm i. For example, if yft = 1, then it means that 1% 
depreciation of US dollar will lead to 1% increase in the stock return of US 
multinational firms. In other words, fii measures the sensitivity of firm's return over 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
Adler and Dumas' (1984) model is useful and widely accepted in the literature 
because it provides a method to estimate the exchange rate exposure of a risky asset. 
Their method can be applied by simply using time series data on the price of the asset 
as well as on the exchange rate movements. In addition, their model is intuitively 
appealing as it resembles the widely used market model in event studies. 
The rationale behind this measurement model is that the probability 
distribution of the future prices in domestic currency of a risky asset can be 
decomposed into two parts: one is correlated with the (set of) exchange rate(s); and 
the other is independent of them. The first part, which is b S in Equation (1), is the 
exposure to be measured, and it can be removed by financial hedging, for instance, 
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with forward currency contracts. However, residual variability still remains. This 
indicates that the second part, which is s in Equation (1), is not exposed to exchange 
risk. As the randomness of s is not correlated with any exchange rate changes, the 
residual risk cannot be further reduced through hedging. 
Nevertheless, this decomposition is simply a statistical technique. The 
exposure coefficient is some sort of a statistical description of the average covariation 
of exchange rates and equity prices, which are two jointly endogenous variables. 
Therefore, the regression coefficient concept and definition does not imply a causal 
relationship between changes in asset values and changes in exchange rates. Instead, it 
allows asset values and exchange rates to be determined simultaneously by underlying 
factors in the economy. Even if the correlation coefficient is significant, one can only 
infer that the rate of return of firms and exchange rate changes are correlated. 
Nevertheless, these two variables may be affected by some common economic forces, 
e.g., monetary shocks. Thus, it is not surprising that at a certain point of time when 
there is a shock in the dominant economic factors, the exposure coefficient will 
change. The average covariation cannot be measured with any level of precision 
under these circumstances. 
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2.3 Exchange Rate Fluctuation and Market Value of the Firm 
In the following two sections, I will examine the development of the literature 
on the impacts of exchange rate changes. 
So far there are two distinct aspects of research in exploring the linkage 
between exchange rate fluctuations and the value of firms. The first one considers the 
impact of exchange rate changes on the expected cash flow and then current value of 
the firm. The second one studies the effects of exchange rate volatility on the market 
risk and cost of capital of the firm. I will discuss them one by one in the following 
two sub-sections. 
2.3.1 Exchange Rate Fluctuation and Stock Return 
As a starting point of an empirical study on exposure, it is quite natural to ask 
if the exchange rate changes affect the value of the firm. In other words, whether a 
significant exposure can be observed. This issue is brought out by the measurement 
models discussed in section 2.2. 
Based on Equation (2), Jorion (1990) proposes a modified model to measure 
the foreign exchange exposure for a specific firm. He introduces the return of the 
market, Rnu, as a second variable in Equation (2) to control for market movements. 
This estimation takes the form of Equation (3): 
代，=Ao + P而Ku + +<^"，t = l, 2, T, (3) 
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where Rit is the rate of return on the /-th company's common stock in period t，R,t is 
the rate of change in exchange rate, and Rmt is the rate of return on a market portfolio. 
Rst is usually measured as the domestic currency price of foreign currency and is 
constructed as trade-weighted for either nominal or real index against several large 
trading partners of the home country. Thus, a positive value for Rst indicates a home 
currency depreciation. Rmt is the rate of return on an equally-weighted or value-
weighted portfolio of domestic firms or on the value-weighted market index. The 
inclusion of yf t j胁 in the model is used to control for the economic factor associated 
with market risk. Therefore, Pu is the exposure coefficient we want to compute, which 
reflects the sensitivity of the common stock return of a specified firm to exchange rate 
changes. Su is the random error term such that cov�Su, yXr) = 0. This market-
adjusted model is the base model, which is often used in early empirical studies (e.g., 
Jorion, 1990; Amihud, 1994; Choi and Prasad, 1995; Donnelly and Sheehy, 1996) 
with estimation based on monthly data. The model is also used to estimate the 
exposure at the industry level (e.g., Jorion, 1991; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993). 
However, the empirical results of the measurement model of foreign exchange 
rate exposure either at the firm level or at the industry level show no significant 
contemporaneous relationship between exchange rate changes and stock returns for 
the sample firms or industries in the US or in other markets. In particular, using 
monthly returns of 287 US multinational firms, Jorion (1990) finds that most 
exposure coefficients are small and insignificant. Jorion reports that for the whole 
sample period from January 1971 to December 1987, only 15 of 287 US multinational 
firms show a statistical significant exposure at five percent level; and most exposure 
coefficients are small relative to their standard errors. In a subsequent study, Jorion 
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(1991) finds that only four out of 20 portfolios of NYSE industrial firms show a 
significant exposure; and cross-sectional differences are significant. Based on data 
from 32 leading US exporting companies from 1979 to 1988, Amihud (1994) 
documents that exchange rate changes have no significant effects on values of US 
exporting companies. Bodnar and Gentry (1993) examine industry-level exchange 
rate exposure for firms in Canada, Japan, and the US, but find that for all the three 
countries, between 20 and 35 percent of industries studied exhibit statistically 
significant exposure at the 10 percent level. 
Employing the same methodology in Jorion (1990) and using monthly data 
from January 1975 to August 1992, Donnelly and Sheehy (1996) examine exposure 
for UK-based firms. They construct a portfolio of UK's 39 largest exporters and find 
a significant contemporaneous relation between the change in the value of the 
portfolio and the exchange rate. 
Nevertheless, a potential measurement problem of Equation (3) is that the 
market and exchange risk factors may be correlated or jointly influenced by some 
external shocks. To avoid any bias due to such multicollinearity between the two 
factors, Choi and Prasad (1995) orthogonalize the exchange rate factor. They employ 
the following model to estimate the exchange exposure: 
Rit = Ao ^PimKt + PiAt�+ �t = 1,2, ...，T (4) 
where Rst�is the orthogonalized exchange rate return. Using monthly interval, they 
examine the currency risk sensitivity of 409 US multinational firms during the 1978 -
1979 period and show that exchange rate fluctuations do affect firm value. 
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Approximately 60% of the sample firms show significant exposure of gaining from a 
depreciation of US dollar. 
2.3.2 Some Limitations of the Measurement Model 
Results of previous work are perplexing given the common belief that 
exchange rate fluctuation should affect the market value of the firm. One reason is 
that the weak evidence on exposure may, indeed, reveal some deficits of the 
measurement model itself. To illustrate these deficiencies, Table 6 gives a summary 
and cites representative studies. I shall discuss each shortcoming in greater details 
below. 
Bartov and Bodnar (1994) argue that one possible explanation of the observed 
weak evidence is the result of the potential drawbacks in the sample selection 
procedures. They point out that although the sample firms of most previous studies 
have substantial foreign activities or foreign denominated assets, many firms that have 
large exports also have large imports. They criticize previous research for attempting 
to generalize relations across firms with opposite signed exposures. They seek to 
avoid this problem by sampling only firms with negative accounting exposures to 
changes in the value of the U.S. dollar as reported in annual financial statements. In 
their study, they assemble a sample of firms that have reported significant (more than 
50/0 of pretax income) foreign currency gains or losses in their financial statements 
during the period 1978 — 1989. They further restrict their sample to the companies of 
which such foreign currency adjustments are negatively correlated with the 
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TABLE 6 
SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE MEASUREMENT MODEL 
Shortcoming Revised Study 
Sample selection procedures Bartov and Bodnar (1994) 
Lagged effect of exposure (Mispricing) Amihud (1994) 
Bartov and Bodnar (1994) 
Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997a, b) 
Donnelly and Sheehy (1996) 
He and Ng (1998) 
Temporal instability of exposure Gao (2000) 
Selection of the exchange rate index proxy Miller and Renter (1998) 
Shin and Soenen (1999) 
Evidence of effective hedging Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
Chow and Chen (1998) 
He and Ng (1998) 
Multicollinearity between exchange rate Bodnar and Wong (2000) 
risk factor and the market factor Glaum, Brunner, and Himmel (2000) 
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corresponding change in the value of the dollar. They regress the quarterly abnormal 
returns of 208 sample firms on the quarterly percentage change in the value of the 
dollar. In spite of their sample selection procedure and their use of quarterly data, they 
fail to find a contemporaneous relation between the returns on the companies in their 
sample and the value of the dollar. 
Then they hypothesize that mispricing takes place as a result of investors' 
errors in modeling and estimating the relation between fluctuations in the dollar and 
the firm value because of the complex set of issues involved. They argue that when 
characterizing the relation between firm value and exchange rate changes, investors 
make systematic errors partly due to not being fully aware of the firm's activities in 
hedging foreign currency exposures; then mispricing occurs. Hence, they introduce 
lagged changes in the value of the dollar in to the regression and extend the market-
adjust measurement model (Equation 3) for exposure as follows: 
代-1 + 凡 . P i . R . j + St, (5) 
/=i 
where Rt, Rm, Rs, Po, Pm, yft, and % follow the definitions in Equation (3), and the 
coefficients measure the lagged effects for the y-th period. Using this model, 
Bartov and Bodnar (1994) find that lagged changes in the dollar are significantly 
negatively associated with current abnormal stock returns of the sample firms; hence, 
mispricing does exist. This result suggests that the stock market takes time to 
incorporate all of the implications of foreign currency movements into share prices. 
They interpret this as either market inefficiency or time variation in expected stock 
returns. 
3 4 
Following Bartov and Bodnar's conjecture of mispricing, Amihud (1994)， 
Donnelly and Sheehy (1996), and He and Ng (1998) use the same multi-period model 
to investigate the lagged effect of exposure. Nevertheless, Amihud's results show 
only some weakly significant lagged relationship between exchange rate changes and 
the returns on US multinational firms' stocks. Donnelly and Sheehy (1996) find a 
weak lagged relationship between the exchange rate and the market value of U.K.-
based large exporters. And He and Ng (1998) find that there is no evidence of a 
lagged effect for Japanese multinational firms. 
In contrast to Equation (5) proposed by Bartov and Bodnar, Chow, Lee, and 
Solt (1997a,b) use the following measurement model to capture the exposure: 
^t.T = A + A . XRTE, ,,, + p,. , + p,. DPRM, + p, • TPRM, + �, (6) 
where Rt,t+Tis the excess stock return of the firm for period t to t+T, XRTEt’t+Tis the 
rate of change in a real exchange rate index for period t to t+T，and DYLDt-�2’t, DPRMt, 
and TPRMt, respectively, denote the prevailing dividend yield, default premium, and 
term premium at period t. This model actually is a transfiguration of Equation (5). It 
divides market factors into three components to control the market impact on the 
value of the firm: dividend yield on a market portfolio, default premium which 
measures the persistent long-term effect of business conditions, and monthly term 
premium which measures the short-term effect. The rationale behind is to follow 
Fama and French's (1989) finding that dividend yield, term premium, and default 
premium exhibit the same business-cycle patterns found in stock and bond returns. 
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Thus, these three factors are used as proxy for the market's ex-ante expected return on 
an asset prior to an unexpected exchange rate change. 
Using the data of 213 US multinational firms from March 1977 to December 
1989, Chow et al. (1997a,b) find that exchange rate exposure of individual firms 
increases with the return horizon and suggest that long-term cash-flow economic 
exposure is positive. They argue that information about the effects on future cash 
flows of current exchange rates can be impounded only in the long run by showing 
that the exchange rate exposure can be attributed to a conjunction of interest rate and 
cash flow effects. In particular, the long-horizon US stock returns are primarily 
determined by the effect of current exchange rate changes on future cash flows which 
cannot be captured by regressing short-term returns on short-term exchange rate 
changes. 
A third deficiency of the measurement model is that empirical evidence on the 
extent to which exchange rate fluctuations affect the value of the firm is complicated 
by the difficulty in identifying explicitly the effects due to exchange rate exposure. 
Most multinational firms are involved in many foreign activities with different 
exposures to exchange rates that change over time. These effects may offset one 
another, causing the firms' exposure as a whole to fluctuate or even switch signs (e.g., 
Levi，1994; Jorion, 1990; Chow et al., 1997b). However, the previously discussed 
measurement models only provide a single comprehensive measure that indicates the 
sensitivity of the whole firm, at a certain future time, to all the different ways in which 
exchange rate changes can affect it. Therefore, estimating exposures for firms with 
fluctuating exposures or for portfolios of firms with offsetting exposures will result in 
insignificant exposure coefficients even if exchange rates matter significantly for firm 
performance. 
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Gao (2000) recognizes the potential of temporal instability of the 
conventionally defined exchange rate exposure, and proposes the following empirical 
model: 
Rn - R f t ^ P X R m t - R f t ) + {(l>nSu + 於 ( 7 ) 
where Ru is the stock market return of firm i over period t, Rmt is the rate of return on 
a market portfolio, Rft is the risk-free rate of return in the period，and dcut is 
unanticipated change in the exchange rate. is the exposure term, 
which is defined as a linear function of the share of foreign sales in the firm's total 
sales, Sit, and the share of foreign output in the firm's total output, x". Therefore, this 
model relates exchange rate exposure to a multinational firm's foreign sales and 
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production positions. Both Su and x" change over time, while the estimated parameters, 
(pii, (h, and (j)i3 are treated as constants, thus such a decomposition allows exposure to 
be time varying. Based on the model, it is found that the stock market correctly 
reveals the profitability effects of unanticipated exchange rate changes, and these 
effects are statistically significant. The US depreciation has significant positive effects 
on the abnormal returns on the stocks of the multinationals through foreign sales and 
significant negative effects through foreign production. 
A fourth limited success of existing empirical studies may be due to the 
selection of the exchange rate index. Most of the extant studies (e.g., Amihud 1994; 
Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; Donnelly and Sheehy, 1996; He 
and Ng, 1998; and Jorion, 1990) examine the relation between changes in the trade-
weighted value of the home currency against several different currencies and changes 
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in the stock prices of multinational firms. In other words, the exchange rate index is 
constructed by taking the weighted average of bilateral exchange rates between home 
country and its major trading partners, which indicates the trade status between home 
country and foreign countries. As pointed out by Miller and Reuer (1998) and Shin 
and Soenen (1999), the underlying assumption of such a foreign exchange proxy in 
the measurement models is that changes in the trade-weighted value of the domestic 
currency affect multinational firms uniformly. That is to say, changes in the trade-
weighted value of the US dollar affect the value of the US firms to the extent that 
multinational firms' international linkage are similar to the national trade with foreign 
countries. The net exposure could be either positive or negative depending on the 
firm's major activity, such as exporting or importing. 
However, the movement of national trade-weighted average exchange rate 
may not appropriately measure the exchange rate exposure faced by individual firms. 
For example, to an American company with a business closely related to Japan, the 
profitability and the value of the company increases or decreases with an unexpected 
change in the value of the US dollar against the Japanese yen, while the appreciation 
of the dollar against the German mark less likely affects its value in the same way as 
the appreciation of the dollar against the Japanese yen will. This fact indicates that the 
value of the same firm may not change with an unexpected movement of the US 
dollar value against a broad set of foreign currencies. 
Apparently, proxies of a single currency do not adequately capture the 
variability in foreign exchange movements. To the extent that firms are not uniformly 
related to the national trade with foreign countries and have different relative linkages 
with the exchange rate index selected or to currencies not included within the index, it 
can be more difficult to detect the exposure. When an index contains currencies to 
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which the firm is not exposed and whose movements deviate substantially from the 
other currencies in the index, it can no longer reflect the exposure that the firm is 
having. Consequently, even though the capital market reflects the exposure 
instantaneously, there is less chance of uncovering the exposure because the firm is 
only exposed to a subset of the composite. Therefore, when using a broad index, large 
measurement errors could result if many of the firms in the sample are not exposed to 
this particular combination of currencies. Thus, the relation between the 
multinationals' stock prices and dollar changes may be weaker if an inappropriate 
exchange rate benchmark is employed. 
To take account of this shortcoming, Miller and Reuter (1998) therefore 
employ a multiple currency model and find that 13 to 17 percent of US manufacturing 
firms are exposed to foreign exchange rate movements. Using a sample of US firms 
from 1983 to 1994, Shin and Soenen (1999) reexamine the measurement of exchange 
rate exposure by using the cumulative translation adjustment. They find that the value 
of US multinationals is significantly correlated with contemporaneous changes in the 
dollar value. They also find that the exchange rate exposure is stable over the sample 
period. 
Most previous work postulates another possible explanation of insignificant 
relationship between exchange rate changes and the value of the firms may be 
evidence of the skill with which these companies are managing their foreign exchange 
exposure (e.g., Adler and Dumas, 1984; Amihud, 1994; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; 
Dumas, 1978; He and Ng, 1998; Levi, 1994). They note that multinational firms make 
extensive use of foreign currency derivatives and other hedging instruments (e.g., 
foreign debt) to protect themselves from unexpected movements of exchange rates 
and thus may eliminate the translation, transaction, and economic exposure. For 
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example, firms can adjust their transaction or balance sheet to establish a well-
balanced portfolio with long and short positions in similar (i.e., highly correlated) 
currencies. Furthermore, they can actively hedge their economic exposure by means 
of various financial instruments including forwards, futures, options and swaps. There 
are several theories that suggest why it may be optimal for a firm to hedge (e.g., 
DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 
1985; Stulz, R., 1984). Subsequent empirical studies focusing on firms' incentives to 
hedge find evidence to support the conceptual conjectures by reporting that the 
magnitude of the exposure can be explained by variables that are proxies for firms' 
hedging incentives (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Chow and Chen, 1998; Chow et 
al., 1997b; He and Ng, 1998). To the extent that firms fully cover their exposure to 
exchange rate movements, we should not expect to find any effect of exchange rate 
movements on firms' values. 
Finally，the underlying assumption of the extant measurement model, which 
includes the exchange rate risk factor and the stock market factor to control the 
market movements, is that both exchange rates and stock returns follow random walks. 
In other words, the market is totally uncorrelated with the exchange rate; hence the 
rate of return captures the unanticipated movements. However, it is possible that the 
exchange rate risk factor and the market factor are correlated. In this sense, Bodnar 
and Wong (2000) and Glaum, Brunner, and Himmel (2000) point out that the slope 
coefficient both in Equation (3) and in Equation (4) no longer reflects the full 
effect of exchange rate changes on return of firm i and, therefore, its economic 
exposure as defined by Adler and Dumas (1984). Instead, it measures firm-individual 
exchange rate sensitivity in excess of the market's exchange rate reaction. This 
difference in the interpretation of coefficient leads to an important conceptual point. 
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To illustrate this, let us consider a special case when all US firms are affected 
by exchange rate changes in exactly the same way. That is, if the US dollar 
depreciates, all firms in the market experience positive returns of the same size. In this 
case, neither Equation (3) nor Equation (4) may show any significant Pis coefficients 
because the changes in the firms' values would be completely captured by the market 
factor. As a result, one might be led to conclude that US firms do not have any 
economic exposure to exchange rate changes. 
To sum up, the extant literature at most document mixed findings. Given the 
measurement model suggested by Adler and Dumas (1984), existing empirical studies 
focus on the relationship between exchange rate movements and value of the firms as 
well as its determinants. Table 7 lists out the evidence on the contemporaneous 
exposure in some previous studies. 
With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree on the following conclusions: 
a) the returns of some firms are significantly related to exchange rate changes, 
while for most firms in the sample, the exposure coefficient is not 
economically significant; 
b) of those firms with significant exposure, some have negative exposure 
while others have positive exposure; 
c) the exposure is unstable because the factors involved change over time, 
peculiarly, there appears to be a lagged response in the change of firm 
values to changes in the exchange rates; 
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TABLET 
EVIDENCE ON EXPOSURE OF SOME PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Study Sample Market(s) Industry or 
— _ Firm level 
Panel A: No Significant Contemporaneous Exposure  
Jorion (1990) US multinational firms Firm 
Jorion (1991) US multinational firms Industry 
Bodnar and Gentry (1993) Canada, Japan, and US market Industry 
Amihud (1994) US leading export firms Firm 
He and Ng (1998) Japanese multinational firms Firm 
Panel B: Significant Contemporaneous Exposure  
Choi and Prasad (1995) US multinational firms Firm 
Donnelly and Sheehy (1996) UK-based large exporters Firm 
Shin and Soenen (1999) US multinational firms Firm 
Gao (2000) US multinational firms Firm 
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d) factors other than market factor are not captured by any coefficients in the 
model. 
However, Levi (1994) points out the fatal defect of the measurement model by 
noting that "... [ejxposure is measured from regression coefficients. This means that 
other than by explicitly modeling the variability of coefficients by special variable-
coefficients econometric techniques, the volatility of exposure will force the 
coefficients toward statistical insignificance. This would lead us to erroneously 
conclude that the firm has little exposure, and to infer either that the firm's foreign 
exchange management is brilliant or the market is stupid... ” 
2.4 Exchange Rate Fluctuation and Market Risk of the Firm 
The mixed results on the relation between exchange rate movements and 
market value of multinational firms and the difficulties of estimating 
contemporaneous firm or portfolio exchange rate exposures have led to refined 
measurement models on the tests of exposure. One of the refinements lies in the 
examination of the volatility of exposure, which concerns the impact of the greater 
volatility of exchange rate changes on stock return volatility and thus on the market 
risk of the firms. 
By examining the relation between exchange rate variability and stock return 
volatility, it is possible to eliminate some problems confounding researchers working 
on exchange rate exposure. First, the sign or time stability of the exposure is much 
less important when focusing on the volatilities. Statistically, I am interested in the 
variance (volatility) rather than the mean (return). Even when the varied activities 
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undertaken by multinational firms may offset the effects of one another during the 
research period, thus resulting in insignificant unitary exposure, the second moment 
will still be able to reflect fluctuations in the expected returns. Therefore, as long as 
the stock return can reflect the foreign exchange changes in either way, an increase in 
stock return volatility can be observed. 
Second, since variances are measured over a multiperiod window, it is not 
necessary to require the relation between exchange rate changes and stock price to be 
contemporaneous. Therefore, the mispricing argument can also be circumvented. 
These two points suggest that tests based on the variance have several 
advantages in identifying a significant impact of exchange rate movement on the 
firms，financial activities. Because of these advantages, some empirical studies start 
to focus on the impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on the market risk of firms 
rather than looking at the exposure itself (e.g., Bartov et al., 1996; Emmons and 
Schmid, 2000). These studies are concerned with the sensitivity of market risk for US 
multinational firms to exchange rate variability and provide another angle to look at 
whether the multinational firms are substantially affected by foreign exchange risk. 
They show that exchange rate variability contributes indirectly to the systematic risk 
of multinational firms by increasing the sensitivity of the firm's return to the return of 
I 
market portfolio. 
Bartov et al. (1996) (hereafter refer to be BBK) focus on two 5-year periods 
around the time of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and test the issue of 
the sensitivity of firm's market risk to exchange rate fluctuations. They use a sample 
、： 
of 109 US firms with foreign operations together with three other control sample 
firms to control the influences of oil-price, firm-size and industry differences. They 






return volatility accompanying with an increase in exchange rate variability. They 
also examine the change on beta for these firms to illustrate that some portion of the 
increased stock return volatility is systematic; as a result, overall market risk of these 
firms rises. They suggest that investors recognize that the overseas activities of 
multinational firms entail additional nondiversifiable risk and they increase the 
required rate of return on equities, which results in the increase of the cost of capital 
for US multinational firms. 
Different from BBK, Emmons and Schmid (2000) look at the pattern of firms' 
betas around the Asian financial crisis. They treat exchange rate risk as a separate risk 
factor and use a multi-factor asset pricing model to estimate the changes in stock 
market risk of 39 S&P multinational firms. Technically, the firm's exposure to market 
risk is decomposed into two components; one is autonomous component, which is 
independent of the crisis; and the other is a crisis-sensitive component: 
代—及/ = A H R . C R I S I S - R f � + s � (8) 
where Rf is the risk free rate, measured as the return on a three-month Treasury bill, 
and Rt - Rf is the excess log return on the firm z's stock. CRISIS is a proxy of the state 
of the Asian crisis; Rm - R / h the excess log return on the US stock market portfolio. 
Therefore, pi is the autonomous component, which is not related to crisis; and Si x 
CRISIS is the crisis-sensitive component. The parameter Si is meant to capture the 
effect of the economic situation in Asia on the CAPM estimated market risk for firm i. 
Their evidence shows that almost one third of the estimates of the crisis-sensitive 
component are statistically significant. In the second stage, Emmons and Schmid 
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(2000) run a regression using the estimates of 5 in Equation (8) as dependent variable 
to analyze the factors that affect the firm betas: 
二 ex SALES, X DEBT] + (9) 
where the explanatory variable is SALES x DEBT, which is the product of the firm's 
ratio of sales to Asia (SALES) and its ratio of book value of long-term debt to total 
assets {DEBT), and co is the error term. They find that leverage-weighted sales 
exposure to Asia exerts a significant positive effect on a firm's CAPM beta. 
These two studies both focus on the market risk of the firm and provide 
evidence that market risk of firms may increase as the exchange rate variability 
increases. However, if the limited success of previous studies in identifying exchange 
rate exposures is due to financially hedging of the exposures, then tests on the 
volatility will offer no advantage. Technically, we can find no methodology so far to 
filter out the hedging effect. What one can do is only to choose a window when the 
possibility for firms to hedge is relatively lower. 
In this study, I focus on the period around the Asian financial crisis because 
the pegged rates in most Asian nations made hedging less necessary in pre-crisis 
period. In addition, hedging tools for Asian currencies are limited. These factors make 




Summarizing previous findings on foreign exchange exposure, several 
conclusions can be reached: 
1. Theoretically, firms with foreign business involvement will be exposed to 
foreign exchange rate fluctuations; and 
2. empirically, the effect of foreign exchange rate exposure of multinational 
firms is mixed, this is partly due to the time lag and instability of exposure. 
Another way to look at the link between exchange rate changes and stock 
return is provided by Bartov et al. (1996) and Emmons and Schmid (2000). Other than 
investigating the exposure to exchange rate changes and/or its determinants, they 
focus on the sensitivity of a firm's beta to exchange rate changes. They conclude that 
the multinational firms do experience an increase in their overall market risk 
corresponding to an increase in exchange rate variability. As a result, investors require 
a higher rate of equity return and the cost of capital for firms will increase. 
This thesis will extend these two studies (Bartov et al., 1996，and Emmons and 
Schmid, 2000) by examining the empirical link between exchange rate variability，on 
the one hand, and stock return volatility and systematic risk, on the other, by focusing 
on the period around the Asia finance crisis. The evidence furthers the understanding 




HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY & DATA 
This chapter is consisted of four sections: empirical hypotheses to be tested are 
formulated in the first section. The second section introduces the research design for 
the study; the third one presents the sample selection procedures, and the final section 
describes the data environment. 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Motivated by Bartov et al. (1996) and Emmon and Schmid (2000), this study 
is an extension of these two studies. In particular, I shall focus on two issues: the 
relation between exchange rate variability and stock return volatility for multinational 
firms; and the link between movement of exchange rates and change in firms' market 
risk, respectively. Following their conjectures, I formulate two empirical hypotheses 
with respect to these two issues to be tested. 
The first research question of this study is to examine whether the volatility of 
stock return of US multinational firms increases with the variability of US dollar 
exchange rates during the Asian Financial Crisis. Based on the literature reviewed in 
Chapter II on theoretical predictions of exchange rate exposure, unanticipated 
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exchange rate changes have influences on the cash flows and thus the market value of 
multinational firms. However, empirically, this exchange rate exposure is difficult to 
be measured accurately. The limited success of the previous investigations is partly 
due to the time variation of the exposure (e.g., Amihud, 1994; Jorion 1990; Levi, 
1994). In order to solve this problem and to further examine the relation between 
exchange rate movement and firm value, I study market risk of a firm and focus on 
the second moment, i.e., variance, between these two variables. 
Theoretically, firms with exchange rate exposure of any sign should 
experience changes in firm value whenever there is a change in exchange rate. Due to 
the multifaceted foreign business involvement, the exposure of multinational firms 
may offset one another. This mitigating effect makes it difficult to measure the 
exposure. However, if the link between exchange rate fluctuations and firm value 
does exist and market is efficient, stock price will reflect the relevant information and 
will fluctuate. Intuitively, this suggests a positive relation between exchange rate 
variability and the stock return volatility of multinational firms. Conceptually, this 
suggests that a firm even with few international operations may be subject to 
exchange rate risk indirectly. This reasoning leads me to propose the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Stock return volatility of US multinational firms increases with the 
exchange rate variability. 
Second, I examine how the Asian Financial Crisis affects the sensitivity of 
large US multinational firms to US stock market risk, that is, whether the economic 
situation in Asia is related to changes in firms' betas. 
49 
In standard corporate finance theory, market risk of a firm (i.e., beta) is 
defined as the extent to which a firm's stock returns are correlated with overall market 
returns: 
（1。） 
where COVfR；, Rm) is the covariance of the return on the risky asset i with the return 
on the market portfolio m, and VAR(RJ is the variance of return on the market 
portfolio. 
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the magnitude of beta 
can be measured as a regression coefficient: it is the coefficient estimated in a 
regression of the firm' s excess returns - i.e., dividends plus price change less the risk 
free return - on market excess returns over some specified period: 
R � R f + ^ 4 R m — R f � + s, (11) 
where is the excess return on firm i, Rfis the risk-free return, Rm is the rate of 
return on the market portfolio, and s is standard error with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
Consequently, when the return on the asset is more volatile, other things equal, 
market risk is expected to be larger. However, we do not expect that all firms' 
riskiness go up at the same time by the same amount. Instead, I expect greater stock 
price responses for firms with greater exposure to the source of increased risk. Hence, 
if exchange rate movement does play a role in the determination of firm value, I 
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would expect that a certain part of the stock return movements are not correlated with 
the market portfolio. Thus, the market risk for those firms with sales exposure to Asia 
will be affected by the volatile fluctuations in Asian currencies. After controlling for 
other confounding explanations, I would conjecture that the betas of the firms in the 
control group, which do not have Asian exposure, remain unchanged. These 
considerations lead to my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Market risk (P) of US multinational firms with sales to Asia increases 
with the exchange rate variability. 
3.2 Research Design 
Following the empirical procedures in BBK, my tests cover a three-year 
window period around the Asian Financial Crisis. Based on the exchange rate regime 
shifts in some Asian countries, which is triggered by Thai Baht crisis, the research 
window is divided into two sub-periods: one and a half year prior to July 2 1997 when 
Thailand forced to abandon its pegged exchange rate of Thai Baht to US dollar, and 
one and a half year afterward. During the second period, several Asian countries 
shifted the exchange rate regimes from pegged rate systems to floating rate 
arrangements. For example, the Philippines shifted the exchange rate regime in July 
11, 97, Malaysia in July 14, Indonesia in August 14, and Korea in November 17 of the 
same year. This change was associated with the corresponding sharp increase in 
exchange rate variability of the Asian currencies. If exchange rate variability and 
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stock return volatility of multinationals are related, the significant difference in 
exchange rate variability should help to detect this relation. 
Furthermore, because most of the Asian countries adopted pegged exchange 
rate arrangements before the Asian Financial Crisis, their currency values were 
relatively stable. Thus, there was less need for firms to hedge their currency risk 
during the pre-crisis period. In addition, there was a lack of sophisticated hedging 
tools for these Asian currencies, as these currencies are not actively traded in the 
international currency market. The choice of this time period can thus reduce the 
possible impact of hedging activities that could reduce the observed effects of 
exchange rate variability on stock returns to some extent. 
The focus of the study on the US multinational firms with Asian sales 
exposure requires a matched control sample group consisting of firms in the same 
industry segments as the sample firms. In order to obtain convincing results, firms in 
the control groups are US multinational firms as well, but report no evidence of Asian 
business involvement. 
As the starting point of the empirical investigation, I am interested in the 
relation between exchange rate variability and stock return volatility. I calculate the 
weekly stock return variance over the two sub-periods for each firm respectively. 
Stock return of each firm are calculated as follows: 
i^�=K/^,)-ln(/^，,—i), (12) 
where R,’t is weekly stock return on firm i in week t, and and are the total 




difference of stock return variance between the two sub-periods is examined. Since 
there are 78 weeks in each sub-period, for each sub-period, the following equation is 
used to calculate the stock return variance: 
78 一 
V A R ( R ) : X � - R i Y m , (13) 
t=i 
where VAR(Ri) is the stock return variance of firm i, Ri’t is the stock return of firm i in 
week t, and Rt is the average weekly stock return of firm i in the sub-period. The 
following chi-squared statistic is used as the test statistic for the significance of 
change in the variance: 
厂 = ( 1 4 ) 
2 = 1 
w h e r e i s the 尸-value for the /^-statistic of the test of the change in variances for firm 
z and N is the number of firms in each sample, which is 129 in the study. Under the 
null hypothesis of no change in stock return variability across two sub-periods around 
the Asian Financial Crisis, the test statistic is asymptotically distributed chi-squared 
with 2 # ( N = 129) degrees of freedom (BBK, pp. 116-117). Therefore, the chi-square 
statistic is used to test Hi. 
To ensure robustness of empirical results, I also perform a nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test the first hypothesis. The Wilcoxon two-sample 
paired signed rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the differences between 
population medians for two samples are equal. The signed rank test is an alternative 
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test that can be applied with no assumption of normal distribution of the variables is 
required. Hence, the nonparametric test can serve as a robust check to results obtained 
from Equation (14). 
The tests of significance in differences are replicated on the stock return 
variance ratio of the two sub-periods for two groups to examine the magnitude of 
shifts in stock return volatility between the pre- and post-crisis periods. Furthermore, I 
also compare the return variances for two portfolios across two sub-periods. 
For the second hypothesis, I test the relation between exchange rate variability 
and the market risk of multinational firms. Following BBK, I employ a single-factor 
market model and estimate the coefficients of each firm's weekly stock return for the 
whole window period from January 1996 to December 1998. 
The model is based on the CAPM but is extended to allow for changes in 
r • 
betas. I estimate, firm-by-firm, the following regression over the window period 1996 
to 1998: 
K i =以z’o + K . K t + A . . K t • DUMt + A’,’ (15) 
where Ri’t is weekly stock return on firm i in week t, a,力 is the constant term, Rm,t is 
weekly return to the S&P 500 index in week t, DUMt is dummy variable set to one for 
the second sub-period from July 2 1997 to December 23 1998, and zero elsewhere, 
and is residual of firm i for week t. Weekly Standard & Poor's 500 stock index 
returns are used for the market portfolio returns because the index is a value-weighted 
index of 500 stocks representing all major industries, and thus can measure the 
performance of the broad economy. 
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The coefficient P i j is the index of market risk (beta) during the first sub-period 
(January 3 1996 - June 25 1997); and y?2’, is the shift in the index of market risk 
during the second sub-period (July 2 1997- December 23 1998) for firm i. Therefore, 
p2j is the parameter of interest. If the increase in market risk of multinational firms 
associated with the increased exchange rate variability can be observed, yft" will be 
positively significant. Based on my second hypothesis, I expect to get a positive 
significant 2^,1 for the sample group and non-significant for the control group. 
The significance of P2’i is tested with two parametric tests. First, I consider the 
significance of the mean of the cross-sectional distribution of (^ 2 / for each group using 
the standard error of the mean. Second, I compute a Z-statistic from the distribution of 
the /-statistic for each firm: 
' - - ' M v p t ^ ^ 0 6 ) 
where /, is /-statistic for the estimate of for firm /, k, is degrees of freedom for firm 
/’ and N is number of firms in the group, which equals to 129 in the study. 
Portfolio tests for each group are also performed using the same time-varying 
extension of the CAPM model in Equation (15). If the firms in the sample group as a 
whole had their market risk increase in the second sub-period, it is expected to get a 
significant fh for the portfolio. But the parameter for the portfolio of the control group 
is conjectured to be insignificant. 




Test statistic Description  
Panel A: Test statistics of the one-tail test on the change in stock return volatility 
^^-statistic Cross-sectional distribution test statistic for the group mean 
Z-statistic Cross-sectional distribution test statistic for the group median 
(with Wilcoxon signed rank test) 
F-statistic Equally-weighted portfolio test statistic for the change in variance 
Panel B: Test statistics on the significance of change in market risk 
Z-statistic Cross-sectional distribution test statistic for the group mean 
广statistic Equally-weighted portfolio test statistic for the change in market risk 
厂 
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3.3 Sample Selection 
This study only concerns foreign sales and foreign productions as two major 
channels through which exchange rate news influences cash flows. Conceptually, 
even firms with few or no international operations may be subject to exchange rate 
risk indirectly (e.g. the electricity plant). The extent to which a firm is exposed itself 
to exchange risk depends on many aspects of the firm like the competitive position in 
the worldwide market. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a multinational's foreign 
production and sales are two important determinants of its exchange rate exposure, as 
exchange rate fluctuations directly impact the revenues and production costs of the 
firm through these two channels. Therefore, sample firm chosen in this study is based 
on its operation areas. Moreover, although the impacts of the Asian financial and 
economic crisis spread worldwide, I treat US multinationals as representative of 
multinational firms. This focus on US multinational firms is also justified because US 
multinationals comprise the largest share of the largest multinational firms worldwide. 
As a matter of fact, more than 35% of the Fortune Global 500 in year 2000 are from 
the US. 
Data on the sample firms are obtained from COMPUSTAT and 
DATASTREAM. I extract data from these two sources because of the following 
reasons. First, these two databases contain comprehensive data on listed firms in the 
US in machine readable format. It is possible that some multinational firms with 
Asian sales may not be included in the databases, but this situation should be rare and 
empirical results should not be affected. Second, data from these two databases are of 
high integrity and these two data sources are widely used in academic financial 
research. 
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There are two groups under investigation: one is the sample group, which is a 
sample of multinational firms with Asian sales, and the other is the control group, 
which is a matched control sample of multinational firms with overseas sales 
elsewhere outside Asia-Pacific region. I briefly describe the sample selection 
procedures in the following two parts and compare the descriptive statistics of the two 
groups in the final part of this section. 
3.3.1 Selection of Sample Group 
To identify US multinational firms for the empirical studies, I go through the 
following steps. To obtain the sample firms, multinational firms' operating areas are 
identified through the COMPUSTAT databases. First, a list of firms with sales in Asia 
is selected by looking for the valid area code in the Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT 
Geographic Segment File (GSF). The COMPUSTAT GSF reports a maximum of four 
specific geographic segments together with annual data on sales, operating income, 
assets, and other information for each company. Each geographic segment contains up 
to five countries/areas. By the geographic region codes, GSF provides an overview of 
the foreign business of a company as reported by the company. Depending on the 
amount of information that is available to COMPUSTAT, all the firms in GSF are 
gone through and are divided into two groups. One group consists of all the firms with 
reported sales in Asia-Pacific region in their annual reports and the firms in the other 
group do not have specified Asian sales data collected by GSF. The first group is 
considered as the list of sample firms, and the second group is the set of candidates 
for the control firms. A caveat is that because COMPUSTAT does not report sales in 
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individual country, the selection procedure may not be a good indication of the degree 
of Asian involvement of multinationals. For example, if a multinational's primary 
sales is to Indonesia, the impacts of the Asian Crisis on this firm may not be the same 
as the impact on another multinational whose sales is mainly to China. However, even 
corporate financial reports do not report operating results in great details. 
In the next step, the list of sample firms is checked with the COMPUSTAT 
Primary, Supplementary and Tertiary (PST) Industrial databases. I require that firms 
have data on basic balance sheet items (sales, assets, etc.) for 1996 and 1997. This 
selection criterion is adopted because the firm-specific data are used in choosing the 
control firms and in the calculation of firms' financial structure. Firms without data in 
the PST databases are excluded. One hundred fifty eight firms meet these 
requirements and have all the necessary firm specific data available. 
In the last round of sample selection, I retrieve weekly total stock return index 
for each company from DATASTREAM. The total return index take into account of 
stock distributions like stock splits and dividends. Thus, this total return index can be 
used directly to calculate the return on the stock as in Equation (12). Only firms with 
a complete record of weekly stock returns over the 3-year investigation period 
(January 1996 to December 1998) are kept in the final sample. Table 9 summarizes 
the sample selection procedures. 
After applying these selection criteria, 129 firms remain in my final sample. 
Appendix 1 is a list of these firms. Table 10 displays the industry distribution of the 
samples. 
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T A B L E 10 
SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURES 
Data Source Requirement  
COMPUSTAT Geographic Segment Firms with reported sales in Asia-Pacific 
File (GSF) region in their annual reports 
COMPUSTAT Primary, Supplementary Firms having data on basic balance sheet 
and Tertiary (PST) Industrial databases items (sales, assets, etc.) for 1996 and 
1997 
Thomson Financial DATASTREAM Firms traded with a complete record of 
weekly stock returns over the 3-year 




INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLES 
SIC Code Primary Industry Classification Number of Samples Percentage 
10 Metal Mining & Related Services 4 3.10 
13 Oil & Gas Production 7 5.43 
20 Food & Related Products 4 3.10 
23 Wood & Textile Products 2 1.55 
26 Paper & Related Products 2 1.55 
27 Publishing & Printing 1 0.78 
28 Chemicals & Related Products 20 15.50 
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 2 1.55 
30 Rubber & Plastic Products 1 0.78 
32 Stone, Clay & Glass Products 1 0.78 
33 Primary Metal Industries 1 0.78 
34 Metal Related Products 5 3.88 
35 Industrial Equipment & Machinery 18 13.95 
3 6 Electronic & Electric Equipment 18 13.95 
37 Transportation Equipment 5 3.88 
38 Instruments & Related Products 12 9.30 
39 Consumer Products 1 0.78 
45 Air Transportation 1 0.78 
46 Pipe Lines 1 0.78 
49 Power Services 1 0.78 
50 Wholesale Industry Products 1 0.78 
51 Wholesale Consumer Products 1 0.78 
58 Dining & Drinking Places 1 0.78 
61 Nondepository Financial Institutions 1 0.78 
62 Security & Commodity Brokers 4 3.10 
63 Insurance 1 0.78 
73 Business Services 12 9.30 
87 Management Services 1 0.78 
Total number of Firms 129 100.00 
This table presents summary industry distribution regarding the sample group and the 
control group used in the analysis. Both groups are comprised of US MNCs. The 129 
firms in the sample group are US multinationals with Asia-Pacific sales based on 
COMPUSTAT PST database. Other 129 firms that have overseas sales outside Asia 
in the same database are selected into the control group. Control firms are matched 
with sample firms based on SIC code and size. Therefore, the industry distributions of 
the two groups are same. 
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3.3.2 Selection of Control Group 
I am interested in testing the hypotheses about stock return volatility and 
market risk around the Asian Financial Crisis. To examine the impact of the increase 
in the Asian currency exchange rate variability on risk of multinationals, I also 
construct a control group. The firms in the control group are selected from the second 
group of firms retrieved from COMPUSTAT GSF. The operational areas of control 
firms are further examined by hand through Hoover's Company Capsules online 
(http://www2.hoovers.com). Firm descriptive data from COMPUSTAT PST and 
continuous weekly stock return index from DATASTREAM are also required. 
The matched control samples also include 129 multinational firms, one control 
firm for each sample firm. The control firms are US multinational with overseas sales 
outside Asia-Pacific region during the sample period. Control firms are matched with 
sample firms based on industry according to the 2-digit SIC classification and firm 
size, which is defined as the market value on December 31, 1997. 
To select a control firm using these criteria, I first find the control firms within 
the same industry. Of these, I then choose the control firm with the closest market 
value for matching. This procedure aim to find a control firm that is closely resembled 
to the sample firm, except on the geographical sales. We should note, however, that 
many multinationals that have sales to Asia are bigger in terms of size. Therefore, the 
population of control firms available to construct this matching sample in general has 
lower market value than the sample group. 
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3.3.3 Comparison of Two Groups 
To give an idea of the differences between the two groups, Table 11 reports a 
comparison of the first, second, and third quartiles of selected descriptive statistics for 
the sample and the control groups. The comparison is based on the data of year 1997. 
It is clear from Table 11 that sample firms are much bigger than the control firms in 
terms of market value of common equity, annual sales, and total assets. The median 
market value of common stock is $2958 million for the sample group and $611 
million for the control group. Moreover, the sample firms in the study have median 
total assets of $1764 million, and annual sales of $1744 million. This compares to 
median assets of $447 million and sales of $408 million for the control firms. 
The difference in size between the sample firms and the control firms is quite 
noticeable, although not surprising, as it is generally believed that larger firms are 
more frequently involved in international activities. This comparison is also consistent 
with previous tests (e.g., Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; and Bartov et al., 1996). 
Nevertheless, with respect to their debt-to-equity ratio and the ratio of earnings 
per share to stock price, the two groups appear roughly similar. The median ratio of 
earnings per share to stock price is 0.041 for the sample group and 0.043 for the 
control group. Nevertheless, there is some difference on the debt to equity ratio: the 
median ratio is 0.132 for the sample firms, compared to a median of 0.194 for the 
control firms. Therefore, the size control sample appears to be an acceptable matching 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Based on the comparison on descriptive statistics for the two groups, we may 
need to explain my results with caution because of the non-perfect matching on firm 
size. However, in terms of stock performance, the second group is able to serve as a 
control, that is, as a way to examine if there are important differences between stock 
return volatility and market risk. 
3.4 Data and the Measurement of the Variables 
In this study, I focus on the relation between foreign exchange rate variability 
and the riskiness, i.e., stock return volatility of a firm. Volatility is a statistical 
measure of the tendency of a market price or yield to vary over time (Gastineau and 
Kritzman, 1999). Volatility is said to be high if the price, yield, or return typically 
changes dramatically in a short period of time. I use stock return volatility as a 
measure of the market risk because the utility theory points out that the return and risk 
can be characterized by the mean and variance of distributions of return offered by 
assets. Volatility is usually measured by the variance or standard deviation of the 
price, or return. Standard deviation is the most widely used measurement of variation 
about a mean, and, for many purposes, a proxy for risk. In most empirical studies, 
standard deviation of return is the generic measurement of risk in most markets. 
Exchange rates between the dollar and foreign currencies are obtained from 
DATASTREAM. For each company, annual measures of foreign sales and foreign 
assets are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database. Weekly returns on individual 
stocks of the firms in both groups and the market portfolio are from the 
DATASTREAM. I obtain weekly stock return index for a 3-year period from January 
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1996 to December 1998. These data are used to compute return for each firm. I chose 
a weekly horizon as the best compromise between maximizing observations while 
minimizing the day-to-day fluctuations that have less direct economic relevance. 
Weekly S&P 500 stock index returns are used for the market portfolio returns. Table 
12 shows the descriptions of the variables used in the study and lists the sources from 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this chapter, I develop the hypotheses, outline the research design, and 
describe the sample selection procedures. Some comparison between the sample 
group and the control group are also reported. Based on the data, the testing 




EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I present evidence of the impact of exchange rate variability on 
volatility of stock return and market risk of US multinational firms. I begin by 
demonstrating the relation between exchange rate variability and the stock return 
volatility. I then examine the effects of exchange rate fluctuations by investigating the 
changes in market risks of the sample firms. Finally, I provide some interpretations 
for the empirical findings. 
4.1 Exchange Rate Variability and Stock Return Volatility 
The first hypothesis to be tested is that stock return volatility of US 
multinational firms increases with exchange rate variability. To test this hypothesis, I 
focus on a 3-year event window from January 1996 to December 1998; and I separate 
the whole sample period into two sub-periods: one before and one after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. I then calculate the variances of weekly returns for each firm in my 
samples over the two 78-week event windows. The first event window (January 3 
1996 - June 25 1997), which I call the pre-crisis sub-period, spans one year and a half 
prior to the abandonment of pegged rate of the Thai Baht to the US dollar. As 
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explained in Chapter III, this division of the sample period is justified as the Thai 
Baht crisis in July 1997 triggered the outbreak of the Asian Financial Turmoil. The 
second event window (July 2 1997 — December 23 1998), which I call the post-crisis 
sub-period, consists of another one year and a half of fluctuant exchange rate changes 
during the Asian financial crisis. Thus, the two event windows are of equal length that 
makes comparison more direct. 
The length of the event window opens some room for discussion. It is true that 
the window length of one and half year is somewhat arbitrary. If the event window is 
too wide, the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis may not be captured. If the event 
window is too short, the number of data points will be too few for meaningful analysis. 
The choice of this window length is based on the compromise between these two 
considerations. 
To measure the impact of changes in exchange rates, I calculate the rate of 
change of an equally-weighted index of the exchange rate of eight Asian 
countries/regions (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand, with January 4, 1995 = 100), which construction is explained 
in the following paragraphs. The exchange rate is quoted as a basket of Asian 
currencies per unit of US dollar. An increase in the index suggests that an 
appreciation of the US dollar against the Asian currencies. Figure 3 shows the 
composite exchange rate index on a week-by-week basis over the period from January 
1996 to December 1998. Figure 3 shows that prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, the 
variability of the index is low. However, dramatic fluctuation occurred after the Crisis. 
Figure 4 and Table 13 depict the distribution of the rate of change on the index. It is 
showed that during the pre-crisis years, exchange rate was quite stable and weekly 
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FIGURE 3 
EQUALLY WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATE INDEX OF SOME ASIAN 
COUNTRIES/REGIONS 
The index is an equally weighted exchange rate index constructed by eight Asian 
currencies: Indonesian Rupiah, Japanese Yen, Malaysian Ringgit, Philippine Peso, 
Singapore Dollar, South Korea Won, New Taiwan Dollar, and Thai Baht. The 
exchange rate is quoted as a basket of Asian currencies per unit of US dollar. An 
increase in the index suggests that an appreciation of the US dollar against the Asian 
currencies. 
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FIGURE 4 
WEEKLY RATE OF CHANGE ON THE COMPOSITE 
EXCHANGE RATE INDEX 
The composite exchange rate index is an equally weighted index of the exchange rate 
of eight Asian countries/regions (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). The exchange rate is quoted as a basket of Asian 
currencies per unit of US dollar. An increase in the index suggests that an 
appreciation of the US dollar against the Asian currencies. 
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T A B L E 10 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE WEEKLY RATE OF CHANGE 
ON THE COMPOSITE EXCHANGE RATE INDEX 









Significance (Pr < W) 0.0001 
PanelB: Pre-crisis (1996.1.3- 1997.6.25) 







� s t a t i s t i c 0.94786 
Significance (Pr < W) 0.0073 
Panel C: Post-crisis (1996.7.2 — 1998.12.23) 







�sta t i s t i c 0.95671 
Significance (Pr < JV) 0.0314 
The descriptive statistics are for the weekly rate of change on the composite exchange 
rate index in different periods, l^-statistic is the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. 
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firms to hedge. However, after the breakout of the financial turmoil in mid-1997, the 
pattern of weekly changes on the exchange rate index altered dramatically. In 
conjunction with the sharply depreciated currencies, the composite exchange rate 
index became much more volatile. The weekly variance of the change in the index 
rose from 1.01x10'^ in the first sub-period to 2.09x10"^ in the second sub-period (F-
statistic = 206.90, p < 0.001). The increase is around 207 times and this result 
indicates a sharp increase in the exchange rate variability for the Asian currencies. 
Meanwhile, the US stock market also became more volatile. As shown in Table 14， 
the variance of weekly return on S&P 500 index doubled to 6.76x10-4 in the post-
crisis period from 3.33x10-4 in the pre-crisis period. 
Weekly firm-level stock returns for both groups in each sub-period are 
calculated using Equation (12) in Chapter HI The distribution of the returns is shown 
in Table 15. The results of Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality show that only the W-
statistic on the stock return of the control firms in the post-crisis period is significant. 
The result indicates that except the control firms' return in the second sub-period, all 
other returns are normally distributed. 
Panel A of Table 16 reports the summary statistics for the cross-sectional 
distribution of total stock variability for the firms in both sample and control groups 
for these two sub-periods. Both groups show increased stock return volatility 
corresponding to the increased exchange rate variability. The average stock return 
variance for the multinational firms rises from 2.82x10'^ in the first sub-period to 
4.88x10-3 in the second sub-period, whereas the average value of the control firms 
increases from 3.65x10"^ in the pre-crisis period to 4.32x10'^ in the post-crisis period. 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE WEEKLY RATE OF RETURN 
ON THE S&P 500 INDEX 






Significance (Pr < W) 0.0093 




^ Kurtosis 0.396 
l^-statistic 0.96289 
Significance (Pr < W) 0.0804 





�sta t i s t i c 0.95711 
Significance (Pr < W) 0.0334 
Panel D: Test for Change in Variance between the Two Sub-periods 
F-statistic 2.03 
Significance (Pr > F) 0.0021 
The descriptive statistics are for the weekly rate of return on the S&P 500 index in 
different periods. ？F-statistic is the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. The F-statistic 
and the reported significance level are used to test the null hypothesis that the 
variances of the return on S&P index are the same across the two sub-periods. 
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CROSS-SECTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FIRM-LEVEL STOCK RETURN 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
(1996.1.3-1997.6.25) (1997.7.2-1998.12.23) 
Panel A: Multinational firms  
Mean 0.0042 -0.0004 
Standard Deviation 0.0058 0.0068 
Max 0.0250 0.0210 
Q3 0.0077 0.0040 
Median 0.0042 0.0006 
Q1 0.0014 -0.0052 
Min -0.0140 -0.0152 
l^-statistic 0.9772 0.9760 
Significance (Pr < W) 0.30 0.25 
Panel B: Control firms  
Mean 0.0043 -0.0017 
Standard Deviation 0.0065 0.0078 
Max 0.0262 0.0133 
Q3 0.0078 0.0035 
Median 0.0040 -0.0004 
Q1 0.0012 -0.0052 
Min -0.0146 -0.0278 
)^-statistic 0.9827 0.9382 
Significance (Pr < W) 0.01 
The table reports the distribution of the stock return of two groups in the two sub-
periods before and after the breakout of the Asian financial crisis. Panel A and Panel 
B show the distribution of the sample group and the control group, respectively. W-
statistic is a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. 
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STOCK RETURN VARIABILITY ACROSS THE ASIAN TURMOIL 
Panel A: Cross-sectional distribution of firm-level stock return variances 
Test statistic 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis for change in 
(1996.1.3-1997.6.25) (1997.7.2-1998.12.23) variance Significance 
Multinational firms 
Mean 0.00282 0.00488 1670.80 <0.001 
Median 0.00194 0.00337 5.391 <0.001 
Q1 0.00112 0.00184 
Q3 0.00368 0.00671 
Control firms 
Mean 0.00365 0.00432 683.57 <0.001 
Median 0.00318 0.00331 1.769 0.038 
Q1 0.00157 0.00213 
Q3 0.00505 0.00576 
Panel B: Cross-sectional distribution of relative firm-level stock return variances 
(variance in the second period / variance in the first period) 
Test statistic 
for change in 
Multinational firms Control firms variance Significance 
““Mean 2.072 1.286 5.457 <0.001 
Median 1.647 1.245 5.635 <0.001 
Q1 1.261 0.950 
Q3  
Panel C: Equally weighed portfolio return variance 
Test statistic 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis for change in 
(1996.1.3-1997.6.25 (1997.7.2-1998.12.23) variance Significance 
Multinational 0.00034 0.00097 <0.001 
firms 
Control firms 0.00036 0.00074 i m <0.001 
The table reports the comparison of the stock return variability between the two sub-periods before and 
after the breakout of the Asian financial crisis. In panel A，the summaiy statistics are for the 
distribution of the variance of each firm's stock return expressed as squared percent in decimal form. 
Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles of the distribution, respectively. The test statistic for the 
mean is a x^(258) statistic for the test that individual firm-level changes in variance for the sample are 
jointly significant. The test statistic for the median is a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Both reported 
significance levels are for one-tailed tests against the alternative that the variances increase between 
two sub-periods. 
In panel B, the reported numbers are major distribution statistics for the ratios of firm-level variance in 
the first sub-period (1996.1.3-1997.6.25) to firm-level variance in the second sub-period (1997.7.2-
1998.12.23) for each sample. The tests are on the difference in the distribution of the ratios between 
sample group and control group; and the reported significance level are for the one-tailed test against 
the alternative that the distribution is higher for the multinational firms than for the control firms. The 
two test statistics are for a t test (for the mean) and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (for the median), 
respectively. 
In panel C, the reported results are stock return variances of the equally weighted portfolios of the 
firms in each group, expressed as squared percentage in decimal form. The /^-statistic and the reported 
significance level are used to test the one-tailed null hypothesis against the alternative that the stock 
return variance increases in the second sub-period. 
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To evaluate the significance of the change in stock return variance of each 
group across the two sub-periods, the chi-squared statistic is calculated by Equation 
(14). The statistic, as reported in Panel A, is 1670.80 {p < 0.000) for the sample group 
and 683.57 {p < 0.000) for the control group, respectively. Therefore, I reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the volatilities of weekly stock 
returns of both groups are higher in the post-crisis sub-period than in the pre-crisis 
period. This finding suggests that return of US multinational firms, both in the sample 
group and in the control group, as a whole are more volatile in the second sub-sample 
period. 
To test the robustness of this finding, I also perform another non-parametric 
test. The non-parametric test is used here since it does not require any assumption of 
the underlying distribution of the variables. The results of a non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test used to the test the median variance are also showed in Panel A of 
Table 16. The test statistic is 5.391 (p < 0.000) for the sample group and 1.769 (p = 
0.038) for the control group, respectively. The result indicates that both groups have a 
distinct median variance in the two sub-periods. Thus, we can also reject the null 
hypothesis of no change in the distribution of stock return variances across the two 
sub-periods for both groups; and the result for the sample group is more convinced 
than the control group. Nevertheless, when judged from the magnitudes of the test 
statistics, the sample group show a more significant result. This indicates that sample 
firms have higher variance than the control firms. 
This result is consistent with BBK's findings that all the sample firms, not just 
multinationals, in their study show increased stock return volatility corresponding to 
the increased exchange rate variability. They interpret this evidence as a result of the 
possible correlation with some forms of increased macroeconomic uncertainty other 
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than the large increase in exchange rate variability itself only. Therefore, my 
observation may also be caused by some common macroeconomic factors. The 
evidence on the increasing stock return variability on the US stock market may reflect 
the uncertainty on the global economy hit by the notably financial turbulence in Asia 
and the fall of investors' confidence. 
Meanwhile, it is conjectured that the sample group is more sensitive to the 
exchange rate fluctuations. Along with the conjecture, therefore, the sample group is 
expected to show a higher increase in stock return variability, because the sample and 
the control groups are exposed to the same set of macroeconomic environment and 
are only controlled by their operational areas. In order to have a more explicit idea, I 
calculate the relative firm-level stock return variances as the ratio of the weekly post-
crisis stock return variance to the weekly pre-crisis stock return variance. The 
construction of this variance ratio is to show the magnitudes of relative change in 
stock return variance of the two sub-periods. If the exchange rate variability does 
account for the change in the stock return variance, the magnitude of such a change, 
and thus the relative ratio of the variances, will be higher for the sample group. 
The results are shown in Panel B of Table 16. By comparing the cross-
sectional distribution of the relative firm-level stock return variances between the two 
sub-periods across the two groups, I find that for all the distribution statistics (mean, 
median, and quartiles), the sample group has higher relative stock return variance 
ratio than that of the control group. The two test statistics are for a t test (for the mean) 
and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (for the median) for a one-tailed test on difference in 
the distribution of the ratios. Both test statistics are significant at the 1% level, which 
means the firm-level variance ratio of the sample group is significantly higher than 
that of the control group. For example, the mean variance ratio is 2.072 for the sample 
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and 1.286 for the control group, which means that the control group shows 28.6% 
average increase in stock return variance during the post-crisis period compared to the 
pre-crisis period; whereas the average increase for the sample group reaches at 
107.2%. This comparison shows that sample firms' variance increase nearly more 
than 80% than those of the control firms. 
Apart from the relative changes, the absolute differences in stock return 
variabilities between the two sub-periods are calculated. The results are shown in 
Table 17. The increase in the mean variance is 2.06x10"^ for the sample group and 
only 6.7x10-4 for the control group. The increases in medians and quartiles are all 
larger for the sample group than those for the control group. The statistics are 
1.43x10-3，7.2x10-4，and 3.03x10'^ for the sample firms compared with 1.3x10"^ 
5.6x10-4, and 7.1x10-4 for the control firms, respectively. 
The results indicate that the increases in stock return volatility, measured by 
both differences and by ratios, of the sample group are larger than that of the control 
group. Therefore, it can be concluded that the increase in stock return variability in 
the post-crisis period is more substantially for the sample group than that of the 
control group. This implies that the sample group is more sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations than the control group. 
Furthermore, I consider the variance of weekly return for the portfolios over 
the two sub-periods. This examination is aimed to test hypothesis one at the portfolio 
level. As discussed in Chapter II, firms may have opposite signs of exposure because 
of involving in different international activities. In the context of firm-level test, 
whether the exposure is positive or negative need not to be considered. However, to 
the extent that firms in the portfolio have opposite signs of exposure, the effect may 
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STOCK RETURN VARIABILITY CHANGE 
BETWEEN THE TWO SUB-PERIODS 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference in Relative change 
variance variance variance in variance 
(96.1.3-97.6.25) (97.7.2-98.12.23) 
Panel A: Multinational firms 
Mean 0.00282 0.00488 0.00206 2.072 
Median 0.00194 0.00337 0.00143 1.647 
Q1 0.00112 0.00184 0.00072 1.261 
Q3 0.00368 0.00671 0.00303 2.535 
Panel B: Control firms  
Mean 0.00365 0.00432 0.00067 1.286 
Median 0.00318 0.00331 0.00013 1.245 
Q1 0.00157 0.00213 0.00056 0.950 
Q3 0.00505 0.00576 0.00071 1.583 
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offset one another and thus result in a smaller observed impact. Therefore, it is 
reasonable that the portfolio-level test is not as powerful as the firm-level test. 
The results are reported in Panel C of Table 16. The return on the portfolio 
formed by the sample group has a variance of 0.34 x 10"^  in the pre-crisis period and 
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rises to 0.97 x 10' in the post-crisis period, which corresponding to a nearly 300% 
increase. The /^-statistic, which is 2.90, indicates that this increase in variance is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The control group portfolio also shows a 
significant increase in stock return variance from 0.36x10"^ in the pre-crisis period to 
0.74x10" in the post-crisis period at the 1% significance level with the F-statistic of 
2.03, but the increase is much less and the significance level is a little bit lower. The 
findings by the portfolio test are consistent with the cross-sectional results in Panel A 
and Panel B, and reject hypothesis one as well. 
To summarize, most firms in the study experienced an increase in stock return 
variability. The higher variances during the post-crisis period indicates that on the one 
hand, investors' uncertainty about the future returns on the stock market had increased 
during the period; and on the other hand, the US stock market reflect the information 
content of the global economy and foreign exchange market. 
4.2 Exchange Rate Variability and Market Risk 
Now I come to the second research question on the relation between exchange 
rate variability and market risk (beta) for multinational firms. As explained in Chapter 
III，this test targets to examine the impact of increase of exchange rate variability on 
the systematic risk and cost of capital of multinational firms. 
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Based on the time-varying extension of CAPM model in Equation (15), the 
OLS estimates of the parameters and for each firm across the two groups are 
calculated. As stated in Chapter III, Pu measures market risk (beta) during the first 
sub-period; and yft" is to represent the shift in the market risk in the second sub-period 
for firm i. Firm-by-firm ^s are presented in Appendix 2; and the cross-sectional 
distribution statistics of each group are presented in Table 18. Summary statistics for 
the cross-sectional distribution of firm-level betas for each group are shown in Panel 
A of Table 19. During the pre-crisis period, the betas of the firms in the sample group 
(mean 0.899 and median 0.866) are similar to those of the control group (mean 0.840 
and median 0.801). Both the 广test for the mean and the Wilcoxon Signed rank test for 
the median indicate the difference is insignificant (^statistic = 0.98, p = 0.33; Z-
statistic = 1.16, p 二 0.25). With respect to the change in betas (fii) for the sample 
group between the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods, the mean is 0.135, with a 
standard error of 0.038 and a Z-statistic of 2.97. Both the mean and the Z-statistic are 
significant at the 1% level for a one-tailed test against the alternative that market risk 
increases in the post-crisis period. The median change in market risk for the sample 
group is 0.122 and the test-statistic from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that it 
is also significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test. For the 
values of Pi and P2 for the sample group, the median (mean) beta rises significantly 
from 0.899 (0.866) during the pre-crisis period to 1.034 (0.988) during the post-crisis 
period, which proposes a 15% increase in market risk. It appears that the US 
multinational firms with sales to Asia show a significantly positive change in the 
� market risk corresponding to the increasing variability of the exchange rates of Asian 
currencies. 
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CROSS-SECTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FIRM-LEVEL MARKET RISK 
Panel A: Multinational firms  
Mean 0.899 0.135 
Standard Deviation 0.486 0.433 
Q3 1.213 0.450 
Median 0.866 0.122 
Q1 0.563 -0.147 
Panel B: Control firms  
Mean 0.840 0.010 
Standard Deviation 0.476 0.477 
Q3 1.140 0.313 
Median 0.801 0.028 
Ql 0.460 -0.305 
The table reports the distribution of the market risk of two groups in the two sub-
periods before and after the breakout of the Asian financial crisis. Panel A and Panel 
B show the distribution of the sample group and the control group, respectively. 
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TABLE 19 
CHANGE IN SYSTEMATIC RISK ACROSS THE TWO SUB-PERIODS 
AROUND THE AISAN TURMOIL 
Panel A: Cross-sectional distribution of firm-level changes in market risk 
Jl k  
Firms Mean Z-statistic Median Mean Z-statistic Median 
Mult inat ional0.899 *** 37.33 0.866 0.135 * 氺 * 0 . 1 2 2 
(0.043) [0.000] (0.038) [0.000] 
Control firm 0.840 *** 29.78 0.801 0.010 0.05 0.028 
— (0.042) [0.000] (0.042) £0.378] 
Panel B: Portfolio tests of changes in market risk 
“statistic Significance 
Firms ^ §2 for A (Ha： p2 > 0) 
Mult inat ional0.899 *** 0.135 * 1.418 0.079 
(0.066) (0.107) 
Control firm 0.840 *** 0.010 0.091 0.464 
(0.080) (0.111) 
* and *** represent statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The table reports the estimation for market risk from the following model, 
Rut = ao + pi，t - Rm,t + fht ‘ Rm,t ‘ DUMt + Si，t, 
where Ri’t is the return to firm i in week t, Rm,t is the return to the S&P 500 index for 
week t. y^coefficients measure the market risk and are time-varying, DUMt is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one for the second sub-period (1997.7.2 -
1998.12.23) and zero elsewhere. Therefore, P2 measures the shift in systematic risk in 
the second sub-period. The sample multinational group comprises 129 multinational 
firms with sales to Asia/Pacific region in 1996 and 1997. The control firm group 
comprises 129 multinational firms, which are matched with primary two-digit SIC 
codes for the same industry, and are matched the size by market value as well. Data 
are weekly over the period from January 3 1996 to December 23 1998. 
In panel A，the Pi and P2 headings contain three columns respectively. The first 
column labeled Mean reports the mean of the OLS parameter estimates for the 
individual firms in each sample (standard error of the mean in parentheses). The 
second column is the Z-statistic, which is a unit normal statistic for the joint 
significance test of the parameter estimates ifii or pi) based on the /-statistics for that 
parameter (fii or yfe, respectively) for each firm in the sample group. The third column 
labeled Median reports the median of the firm-level parameter estimates for each 
sample. The number below in square brackets is the p-value for the signed-rank test 
for the median. Reported significance levels are for one-tailed tests against the 
alternative that the market risk increases. 
In panel B, the numbers are OLS estimates of the market exposure (fii) and its change 
over the second sub-period (fii) for equally weighted portfolios of the firms in each 
sample group. White (1980) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
the reported significance is for a one-tailed test against the alternative that the market 
risk increases. 
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The mean and median market risk changes for the control group are also 
shown in Panel A. The mean p2 is 0.010, with a standard error of 0.042 and a Z-
statistic of 0.05, which indicates that P2 is close to zero. And the median of P2 is not 
significantly different from zero, either. This suggests that there is no apparent change 
in market risk for the control group. 
The model (Equation 13) is also estimated separately for the portfolios of the 
two groups. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 19. As guided from this 
Table, the significance level of estimated p2 across two groups resembles the findings 
from the firm-by-firm tests. Compared to the results in Panel A, the value of the 
estimates does not change, but the statistical significance has been reduced. The shift 
in beta for the portfolio of the sample group is 0.135, which is weakly significant at 
the 10% level using White's (1980) heteroskedastic corrected standard errors. The 
corresponding shifts in beta for the control group is insignificantly different from zero. 
Though weaker than the firm-by-firm results, these portfolio results support the 
finding of increased market risk for US multinational firms with sales to Asia-Pacific 
region. 
The overall results are consistent with hypothesis 2: the estimate of P2 for the 
firms in the sample group is positive and also statistically significant; and the same 
estimated parameter for the firms in the control group is statistically insignificant. In 
other words, this finding implies that in conjunction with the increase in stock return 
variability, there is also an increase in market risk for multinational firms with sales to 
Asia-Pacific but there is no such increase for control firms. 
� This observation suggests that although most firms in the study experienced an 
increase in stock return volatility following the exchange rate regime shifts in some 
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Asian nations, there is significant difference in the nature of this increased volatility 
across the sample group and the control group. This increased volatility can thus be 
divided into two parts: one part is shared by both groups, and the other part is unique 
for the sample firms. 
For the sample firms, a significant increase in beta during the second sub-
period is observed. This indicates that the Asian currency exchange rate risk, which is 
a component of the increased volatility unique to the sample firms, increased the 
firms' systematic risk with respect to the US equity market portfolio. Consequently, 
investors would demand higher rate of returns for holding the stocks of these firms. 
This in turn raises the firms' cost of equity capital. Firms that saw their betas rising as 
a result of the crisis would face higher equity financing costs. When the financial 
managers evaluate an investment project, they should use a higher discount rate to 
calculate the required return on the project. Hence, the Net Present Value (NPV) of 
investment projects will be lowered and firm value will be affected. 
The remainder shift in the stock return variability for both groups in response 
to the Asian financial crisis are shared to the same degree by the market as a whole 
and thus can be diversified away. This evidence is also consistent with the point 
proposed in Chapter 11 that to some extent the exchange rate risk factor and the 
market factor are correlated, and thus such a correlation mitigates the magnitude of 
exposure measured by Jorion's popular model. 
Given the above evidence, it can be concluded that the risk position of 
multinational firms is sensitive to the movements of exchange rate of the certain 
currency, which is directly related to the firms' international operations. 
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4.3 Interpretations 
The empirical results in Section 4.1 suggest that the variance of stock returns 
for the sample firms increased quite dramatically during the second sub-period when 
the exchange rate of Asian currencies was unusually volatile. The variance of the 
control firms also reached a higher value in this sub-period but the increase was not as 
dramatic as that of the sample firms. This result is consistent with BBK's finding that 
the volatility of monthly stock returns of multinational firms increase significantly 
corresponding to the period when the exchange rate regime switching from fixed to 
floating. 
Moreover, empirical results in the Section 4.2 suggest that US multinational 
firms with sales to Asia-Pacific shown a significant increase in market risk 
corresponding to the increase in exchange rate variability across the two sub-periods 
before and after the Asian financial crisis. 
In order to get a general picture of change in stock return variability and 
market risk of all firms in the study, I also calculate the percentage of firms with 
statistically significant increase and decrease of variance and beta. The results, as 
showed in Table 20, demonstrate that the more firms in the sample group show 
increased stock return variability and market risk in the post-crisis period. 60.47% of 
the firms in the sample group show a significant increase in stock return variance, and 
14.73% have a significant increase in market risk, almost double the percentage of 
34.11% and 7.75% of the control group, respectively. The results thus support the 
� empirical evidence discussed in previous sections. 
The findings in the study can also be used to illustrate some phenomena 
during the Asian financial turmoil. 
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CROSS-SECTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FIRM-LEVEL 
CHANGES IN STOCK RETURN VARIANCE AND CHANGES IN BETA 
Sample Group Control Group  
Number of Firms % Number of Firms % 
Panel A: Change in Stock Return Variance  
Significant Increase 78 60.47 44 34.11 
Significant Decrease 1 0.78 10 7.75 
Panel B: Change in Beta  
Significant Increase 19 14.73 10 T^S 
Significant Decrease 3 2.33 12 9.30 
This table is used to show, apart from mean, median, the number and percentage of 
the firms having significant increase and decrease in stock return variance and beta 
during the post-crisis sub-period. 
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4.3.1 Phenomenon 1 ： Cost of Equity and Net Cash Flows 
Within the corporate finance context, cost of capital is used as a company-
wide benchmark discount rate; the benchmark is adjusted upward for unusually risky 
projects and downward for unusually safe ones. Cost of capital is calculated as the 
weighted average of cost of debt, h , and cost of equity, ks, which is estimated using 
CAPM model equation: 
K 二 R 一 [ E ( R J - R / \ 。 戸 ( 1 7 ) 
where Rf is risk-free rate of return, proxy by the 3-month rate on US government 
Treasury bills, E(Rm) is expected future rate of return on the market, and yft is the 
systematic risk of the common stock of the firm. This implies that when other things 
equal, an increase in the market risk will result in an increase in the cost of equity and 
thus cost of capital for a firm. When a firm considers an investing project, it should 
discount the cash flows of the project at the expected rate of return that investors 
would demand to make a separate investment in the same project, and should accept 
the project that more than compensates for the project's beta. Practically, many 
companies estimate the rate of return required by investors in their stocks and use the 
cost of capital to discount the cash flows on all new projects. Since investors require a 
higher rate of return from a very risky company, such a firm will have a higher cost of 
capital and will set a higher discount rate for its new investment opportunities. 
This evidence in this study of increased market risk of sample firms during the 
post-crisis period thus has substantial influence on investment decisions when 
9 0 
financial managers use rules of thumb on cost of capital to evaluate a project. This is 
to say, during the Asian financial crisis，the multinational firms, which have sales to 
Asia, faced more risk than the average firms and, therefore, should have demanded a 
higher rate of return from its capital investments. When the cost of capital is higher, 
the investment opportunities would be fewer. This in turn will lead to a reduction in 
the investment projects and a decrease in inflow of the capital for the project. 
The evidence provides an alternative explanation for the capital flows of some 
Asian countries during the Crisis. Table'21 shows the net capital flows into the four 
crisis-hit Asian countries - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand — during the 
study period. Foreign capital flows were substantial during the pre-crisis years. Each 
experienced large current account deficits, which means that funds borrowed from 
abroad (a capital inflow) financed a large portion of domestic investment spending. In 
1996, the net capital inflow to these four countries climbed to $50 billion, allowing 
these economies to maintain a higher rate of investment spending than could be 
supported by domestic saving alone. The reversal of this capital inflow was swift 
when currency and financial turbulence hit the region, beginning with Thailand in 
mid-1997. Net capital inflows declined to $21 billion for 1997 as a whole, but were 
close to zero during the second half of the year. In 1998, the four countries had net 
capital outflows of $68 billion. That is, over the 3-year period, there was a swing of 
$118 billion in international capital flows. Instead of receiving fiinds, these crisis 
countries were facing the fact that investors wanted to take capital out of the 
countries. This implies that foreign investment projects were plunged during the 
crisis, which can be partly explained by the cost of capital conjecture. 
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T A B L E 10 
NET CAPITAL FLOWS OF FOUR ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Billions of US Dollars 
Country 1996 1997 1998 “ Change i n ” 
1996-98 
Korea -23.0 ^ 
Thailand -14.7 -3.0 14.2 28.9 
Indonesia -7.7 -4.9 4.0 11.6 
Malaysia ^ ^ 14.1 
Total -49.9 -20.8 68.3 118.2 
Memo: 
United States -129.3 -143.8 -220.6 -91.3 
Source: Higgins and Klitgaard (2000). (International Monetary Fund) 
Data are based on the current account balances, which include the trade balance for 
goods and services, the balance fro factor services, and unilateral transfers. Negative 
value indicates current account deficits, meaning that funds borrowed from abroad (a 
capital inflow). 
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4.3.2 Phenomenon 2: Increased Return Variability and the US Stock Market Return 
Several previous studies notice the surprising immunity of US economy to the 
Asia crisis: despite of the disruptions in the Asian markets, US economy grew 
strongly throughout the 1996 - 1998. For example, contrast to the plunge in the GDP 
growth of some Asian countries, GDP growth in the US was healthy 4.3 percent in 
1998 (Harrigan, 2000; Wincoop and Yi，2000) 
In addition to the small effects of the Asia crisis on the US macro economy, the 
Wall Street turned out to be a good year during the period despite of the deteriorated 
outside economic situation. Figure 5 contrasts the divergent paths of US and Asian 
emerging-market financial returns throughout the period. The cumulative total return 
during the three-year window on the S&P 500 index was an astonishing 109 percent, 
whereas the risk-free return on the US three-month Treasury bill suffered 12.5 percent 
loss in the same period. In other words, the return on the market portfolio offered 
nearly 120 points percentage higher return than the risk-free rate. Meanwhile, the US 
dollar denominated total return during the three years on the FT/S&P Pacific Basic 
Industry Index (excluding Japan) was about negative 55 percent. 
Interestingly, such a surge in stock prices of the US multinational firms was 
not lead by increased profits. As a matter of fact, earning per share of the firms 
remained flat. Table 22 compares the earnings per share for all firms in the study 
between 1996 and 1997. Although the change is not significant, it can be observed 
that the average earnings per share for the sample group fell from US$ 1.908 in 1996 
to US$ 1.521 in 1997, and the figure dropped from US$ 1.277 in 1996 to US$ 1.015 
in 1997 for the control group. 
9 3 
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Source: Thomson Financial Datastream. 
FIGURE 5 TOTAL RETURN INDICES OF UNITED STATES AND ASIAN 
EMERGING MARKETS (IN U.S. DOLLAR TERMS) 
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T A B L E 10 
COMPARISON OF EARNINGS PER SHARE BETWEEN 1996 AND 1997 
Significance 
1996 1997 Test statistic /7-value 
Sample group 
Mean 1.908 1.521 1.543 0.124 
Median 1.720 1.530 1.313 0.189 
Control group 
Mean 1.277 1.015 - 0.335 0.738 
Median 1.357 1.040 - 0.133 0.894 
The summary statistics are the mean and median for the cross-sectional distribution 
of earnings per share in US dollars for firms in each group. The test statistic for the 
mean is a two-sample Mest; and the test statistic for the median is a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. Both reported significance levels are for null hypothesis that the 
earnings per share are the same in 1996 and 1997. 
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To understand this phenomenon of surge in US stock prices together with the 
flat in earnings per share corresponding to the increase in market risk of US 
multinational firms, a single risk-based explanation seems plausible. Although 
alternative explanations may exist, the “option theoretic interpretation of the firm" can 
be used. 
The Option Pricing Theory (OPT) is first applied into corporate finance by 
Black and Scholes (1973). The key insight of this approach is that the equity of a firm 
that has issued debt (e.g., corporate bonds) is identical to a call option written on the 
assets of the levered firm, with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm's debt. 
The debtholders effectively acquire the firm and is secured by the assets of the firm; 
the shareholders obtain the call option to buy it back by paying off the debt in full 
with interest. The shareholders have the right - but not obligation — to exercise the 
call option on maturity date. If, on the maturity date, the value of the firm exceeds the 
face value of the debt (plus interest), the shareholders will exercise their call option by 
paying off the bonds and keeping the excess. On the other hand, if the value of the 
firm's assets is less than the amount of the debt, the shareholders will choose to 
default on the debt by allowing their call option to expire unexercised and "walk 
away" from the firm; and the bondholders will get to keep the firm's assets. Thus, the 
bondholders will end up either with their money back (plus interest) or the firm itself, 
whichever is less valuable (because the choice is made by the shareholders). 
How does this apply to the conjunction of high stock returns, as shown in 
Figure 5, and increased market risk of US multinational firms dunng the Asian crisis? 
OPT indicates that one key determinant among several of the value of any option is 
the volatility of the underlying cash flows upon which the option is written. In other 
words, in line with standard option theory, the valuation of these options reflects 
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uncertainty about the future value of the underlying assets. When this uncertainty 
increase, the value of the option increases, to the benefit of those with a long position, 
such as shareholders. If the stock return is more volatile, then the option has more 
upside potential whereas the downside is fully protected. That is, the value of a call 
option on the assets of a firm, i.e., the level of equity prices, increases when 
fundamental business risk increases. 
In the present application, the US corporate sector generates cash flows for 
which corporate shareholders and corporate bondholders have claims. When the 
fundamental business risk increases, the underlying cash flow becomes more volatile. 
Precisely because the owner of the option has the right but not the obligation to 
exercise it, a greater dispersion of likely outcomes - i.e., higher risk - enhances the 
value of the option. The option holder, who is the shareholder of the firm, can capture 
all of the increased "upside" while ignoring all of the “downside,” even if this has 
increased as well. Therefore, shareholders prefer higher variance on the stock return 
than lower. Such a view of equity and debt valuation thus can partly describe the 
actual behaviour of market prices during 1996 — 98 period, that stock prices went up 
even while earnings per share were flat. Investors may have bid up stock prices 
because the range of fiiture earnings estimates had increased even if their expected 
level did not change. 
4.4 Alternative Explanation 
Although the findings in this study are interpreted that increase in stock 
volatility is a result of increased exchange rate variability, there may be some possible 
explanations other than exchange rate fluctuations. 
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One possible explanation for the change in market risk is suggested by 
Hamada (1972). In his paper, Hamada argues that the estimation of the market risk is 
affected by two factors: asset risk and corporate leverage. Under the assumption that a 
firm's debt is riskless, its market risk can be written as the product of its asset risk and 
the ratio of the market value of the assets to the market value of the firm's equity: 
力厂/五)， (15) 
where is the market risk of firm i estimated by the market model, Api is the asset 
risk of firm i, V is the market value of assets, E is the market value of equity, and thus 
V/E is the index of financial leverage. Hamada shows that nearly 21 — 24% of the 
observed systematic risk of 304 firms' common stocks can be explained merely by 
corporate leverage. Along this reasoning, therefore, the increase in market risk may 
possibly be the result of increase in financial leverage rather than the increase in asset 
risk. In order to demonstrate that our finding that the increase in market risk for 
multinational firms arises from the increased exchange rate variability, but not from 
the increase in financial leverage, we examine the corporate leverage of two groups 
around the window period. 
Table 23 shows the summary statistics for the cross-sectional distribution of 
corporate leverage for each sample. The corporate leverage is calculated as the ratio 
of firm value (long-term debt plus the market value of equity) to market value of 
equity. The average leverage ratio for the sample group arose from 1.143 in 1996 to 
1.162 in 1997; the same statistics are 1.198 and 1.215 for the control group, 
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T A B L E 10 
COMPARISON OF FIRM-LEVEL FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
BETWEEN 1996 AND 1997 
Significance 
1996 1997 Test statistic p-vdue 
Sample group 
Mean 1.143 1.162 - 0.997 0.320 
Median 1.110 1.132 - 1.212 0.226 
Control group 
Mean 1.198 1.215 - 0.598 0.551 
Median 1.149 1.194 - 0.708 0.479 
The summary statistics are the mean and median for the cross-sectional distribution 
of financial leverage, defined as the ratio of long-term debt plus the market value 
of equity to market value of equity, for firms in each group. The test statistic for 
the mean is a two-sample ^-test; and the test statistic for the median is a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. Both reported significance levels are for null hypothesis that the 
corporate leverage is the same in 1996 and 1997. 
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respectively. Both two-sample /-tests for the mean and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for 
the median suggest that financial leverage increases insignificantly for both groups 
between the two sub-periods. This evidence indicates that changes in leverage did not 
matter at all. Therefore, the increase in the market risk for multinational firms cannot 
be interpreted as an evidence of increase in corporate leverage. Instead, such an 
increase in beta must be due to an increase in the asset risk. 
4.5 Summary 
Results shown in this Chapter indicate that increase in exchange rate 
variability due to the change in exchange rate regime in some Asian economies during 
the crisis is associated with a statistically significant increase in stock return volatility 
for US multinational firms with sales to Asia-Pacific. This increase in volatility is 
more eminent when compared with the control firms. I further illustrate that some part 
of the increased stock return volatility is systematic in nature, as the market risk (beta) 
of sample firms rises in the period of increased exchange rate variability. The 
important implication is that these firms faced higher financing cost during the crisis. 
1 0 0 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Numerous studies (e.g., Jorion, 1990; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; Amihud, 
1994; Choi and Prasad, 1995; Donnelly and Sheehy, 1996; He and Ng，1998; Gao, 
2000) examine the effects of unanticipated exchange rate fluctuations on the value of 
the firm in different countries. Extant literature show that this effect, which is known 
as exchange rate exposure in the finance literature, is difficult to measure because it is 
time variant. This study addresses the exposure issue by analysing whether there 
exists any relationship between fluctuations in foreign exchange rates and stock return 
volatility. In addition, this research also examines the change in market risk for US 
multinational firms. 
Based on the availability of the breakdown of sales information and focusing 
on a three-year window around the Asian financial turmoil, the analysis is applied to a 
group of US multinational firms with business in the Asia-Pacific region. The control 
group is consisted of matched US multinational firms without report sales to Asian 
customers. It is shown first that the volatility of common stock return for the 
multinational firms increases significantly corresponding to the exchange rate 
variability increases. Next, the study examines the shift in market risk during the post-
crisis period when the exchange rate is much more volatile than the pre-crisis period. 
When a time-varying Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) type model is employed 
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to estimate the market risk, it is found that firms with sales exposure to Asia show a 
statistically significant increase in market risk whereas there is no such evidence on 
the control sample. This finding suggests that the Asian crisis changed many of these 
firms' sensitivity to US stock market movements, that is, their CAPM betas. 
The overall results support the findings in Bartov, Bodnar, and Kaul (1996) 
that multinational corporations, compared with domestic firms, saw their market risk 
raising as a result of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and volatile 
exchange rate changes. Therefore, the evidence in this study furthers our 
understanding of the relation between exchange rate rates movements and the stock 
return performance of US multinational firms. The empirical findings support the 
notion that there exists a link between exchange rate and firm value. In addition, 
findings here are consistent with the theoretical discussion and the weak existing 
empirical evidence on exchange rate exposure. Therefore, my test results contribute to 
extant literature on exposure by providing new direction on this topic. 
Moreover, this thesis sheds light on the impacts of the Asian financial crisis 
with a view to influence of this event on large US based firms. In particular, the 
effects on volatility of stock returns and market risks of US multinationals are studied. 
The evidence thereby provides additional insight on the effects of exchange rate 
movements during the Asian turmoil on the stock price determinants to multinational 
firms. 
The evidence in this thesis generates several important implications for 
different parties. From a methodological point of view, this study provides another 
approach to investigate the relationship between exchange rate fluctuations and the 
value of the firm other than measuring the exact impact of foreign exchange exposure. 
The analysis reveals that focusing on the variance of return is better than looking at 
1 0 2 
the stock return alone. With respect to time varying nature of exposure, variance is an 
important aspect to analyse and has some advantages over the traditional exposure 
measurement model. It is because variance covers a multi-period window and is not 
affected by the sign of exposure. The significant results in the study suggest that such 
an approach can mitigate the measurement problems of time varying of exposure. 
The empirical results of the study also support the empirical evidence of the 
impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the stock return volatility and market risk of 
firms. These findings underscore the view that unexpected exchange rate changes has 
a significant effect on the value of the firm and thus have implications on the 
decisions for investors in portfolio risk management as well as for firms in financial 
operations. In other words, a proper way to hedge is essential for investor and 
corporate welfare. 
When firms operate internationally, they are exposed to additional risks that 
are less relevant for domestic firms and need to avoid the risk factor arising from 
volatile exchange rate fluctuations. For investors, therefore, when investing in 
multinational firms, they are confronted with such a risk and should be paid a 
premium. In this framework, they require a higher rate of return in order to provide 
funds to the firm. The required rate of return is the opportunity cost to the investors of 
investing resources elsewhere in opportunities with equivalent risk. If one stock has a 
greater marginal effect on portfolio risk than another stock, it must also have 
proportionately greater expected return. Therefore, estimating market risk is essential 
for investors in portfolio management. Consequently, when constructing a portfolio, 
investors should note that the stocks of multinational firms will add to the risk of the 
portfolio if the exchange rates related to their businesses fluctuates, so investors 
would buy them only if they also increase the expected return. In other words, if the 
1 0 3 
market risk of the firm increase, investors demand higher return on holding the firm's 
shares. According to this criterion, investors could make investment decisions and 
form portfolios in order to achieve their expected utility of wealth. 
The evidence in this study shows that exchange risk is not diversifiable. 
Exchange rate changes would have substantial impact on the firm's systematic risk 
and thus cost of capital. In the corporate world, these findings have two major 
implications for financial managers. Firstly, evidence shows that foreign exchange 
risk is still a concern for multinational firms for the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations on the stock return volatility and market risk. Given that the value of the 
dollar appears to be one factor that differentially affects US stock market, exchange 
rate exposure is priced in the arbitrage pricing theory framework. Managers need to 
devote resources to the management of foreign exchange risk. And firms could affect 
their cost of capital through currency hedging policies. Therefore, realizing the 
respondence of market risk to economic environment is essential for financial 
managers in making hedging decisions. 
Secondly, the cost of capital issue is fundamental when financial managers 
make investment decisions. Practically, cost of capital is served as a benchmark 
discount rate to calculate the net present value of a project. When market risk of the 
firm increases, financial managers should make the adjustments on the benchmark 
accordingly. A firm could respond to this by effective hedging or changing its 
investment plans. Consequently, for a given schedule of investments a rise in the cost 
of capital will result in less investment. 
Although the tests in the study support the existence of co-movements of 
exchange rate variability and stock return volatility, such an analysis has several 
limitations. While I suggest that the observed stock return volatility corresponds to the 
104 
exchange rate variability because most firms in the study show an increase in return 
variability during the post-crisis period, I cannot rule out the possibility that the 
observed increase is driven by other unobserved exogenous variables. Further 
investigation into such unknown factors is a fmitflil area for future research. 
In this study, I argue that the increase in exchange rate variability rather than 
the increase in financial leverage contributes to the observed increase in market risk. 
However, due to data constraint, I am not able to have the firm-specific data from 
1998 afterwards. Results will be more convincing when I can use enough data in firm-
level analysis. For example, in the comparison of earning per share and leverage 
between the two sub-periods, using two-year data of 1996 and 1997 is apparently not 
enough. In addition, with a richer dataset, the examination of the relation between 
change in market risk and Asian sales ratio for the multinational sample is also a 
possible direction for future research. 
Finally, I employ the Option Pricing Theory and compare firms' earnings per 
share during the study window to illustrate the increased return volatility partly 
accounted for the growth in return. Such an illustration is not convincing unless I can 
construct a sample of firms and conduct an investigation on the linkage between stock 
return variability and stock return. With available data, this is another interesting area 
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APPENDIX 2 
ESTIMATES OF CAPM BETAS 
Panel A : Sample Firms 
SIC SMBL BETAl ^-Statistic BETA2 ^-Statistic 
10 BMG -0.124 - 0.299 0.533 1.056 
10 CDE 0.073 0.168 0.173 0.327 
10 FCX 0.713 2.251 ** -0.104 -0.270 
10 NEM 0.262 0.641 -0.092 -0.187 
13 ATW 0.209 0.491 1.355 2.628 *** 
13 DO 0.560 1.357 0.702 1.404 
13 FLC 0.803 L561 0.621 0.996 
13 MRL 0.520 0.927 1.406 2.069 ** 
13 o n 0.296 0.764 0.265 0.562 
13 PKD 0.696 1.683 * 0.691 1.378 
13 UMR 0.376 0.809 0.257 0.455 
20 HNZ 0.758 4.631 *** -0.212 -1.068 
20 KO 1.284 7.642 *** -0.258 -1.265 
20 RAL 1.062 5.978 *** -0.531 2.465 ** 
20 WWY 0.885 6.329 *** -0.026 -0.154 
23 KWD -0.045 - 0.147 0.560 1.498 
23 SA 0.076 0.086 0.523 0.484 
26 IP 0.693 3.126 *** 0.093 0.347 
26 MMM 0.863 4.888 *** -0.359 -1.675 * 
27 DJ 0.563 3 011 *** 0.237 1.045 
28 AGN 0.501 2.427 ** 0.238 0.952 
28 AHP 1.068 4 970 *** 0.039 0.148 
28 AVP 1.133 4.266 *** -0.426 -1.323 
28 BOA 0.291 1.261 0.291 1.039 
28 CYT 0.398 1.069 0.807 1.784 * 
28 EL 0.615 2.535 ** 0.353 1.200 
28 FOE 0.454 2.352 ** 0.102 0.434 
28 HPC 0.920 4.633 *** -0.485 -2.013 ** 
28 ISP 0.516 2.032 ** 0.266 0.863 
28 JNJ 1.298 8.573 *** -0.686 3.735 *** 
28 LZ 0.622 3.410 *** -0.131 -0.594 
28 MRD 0.684 1.595 0.008 0.015 
28 MRK 1.326 7.680 *** -0.299 -1.428 
28 MTX 0.492 2.177 ** 0.170 0.621 
1 1 6 
SIC SMBL BETAl ^-Statistic BETA2 f-Statistic 
28 NCH 0.317 1.875 * -0.053 -0.257 
28 NLC 0.866 5.658 *** -0.276 -1.485 
28 PFE 1.187 5 748 *** -0.144 -0.574 
28 PG 0.972 5.533 *** -0.325 -1.524 
28 PNU 0.625 2.803 *** 0.307 1.135 
28 ROH 0.836 4.177 *** 0.087 0.360 
29 KWR 0.415 1.981 ** 0.235 0.922 
29 MOB 0.437 2.765 *** 0.038 0.200 
30 NKE 0.873 2.920 *** -0.212 -0.583 
32 GLW 1.100 4.268 *** 0.253 0.809 
33 AA 0.469 2.104 ** 0.356 1.315 
34 BLL 0.513 2.230 ** 0.739 2.647 *** 
34 CCK 0.835 3.422 *** 0.154 0.519 
34 HSC 0.662 2.228 ** -0.189 -0.523 
34 SGR 0.972 1.755 * 0.450 0.671 
34 WTS 0.310 1.223 0.310 1.008 
35 AMAT 2.101 4.956 *** -0.170 -0.331 
35 BLD -0.371 - 1.032 1.006 2.308 ** 
35 DELL 1.341 3.147 *** 0.471 0.912 
35 EMC 0.901 2.815 *** 0.853 2.197 ** 
35 GGG 0.947 3.009 *** -0.057 -0.150 
35 GTW 0.933 1.920 * 0.714 1.212 
35 IBM 1.173 5.163 *** -0.118 -0.427 
35 lEX 0.423 1.771 * 0.652 2.251 ** 
35 ION 0.823 3.444 *** 0.173 0.597 
35 PLL 1.030 4.606 *** -0.548 2.023 ** 
35 PNR 0.571 2.285 ** 0.339 1.118 
35 PXR 0.609 2.058 ** 0.333 0.927 
35 SEG 1.488 3.505 *** 0.315 0.611 
35 SUL 0.319 0.577 0.195 0.291 
35 TIE 1.339 2.047 ** 0.056 0.070 
35 TYC 0.641 2.449 ** 0.623 1.964 ** 
35 VRC 0.331 0.673 0.758 1.272 
35 WDC 1.845 3.172 *** 0.122 0.174 
36 ADI 1.582 3.891 *** 0.424 0.860 
36 AMD 1.716 3.721 *** 0.105 0.188 
36 AMP 0.951 3.677 *** -0.417 -1.329 
36 AVX 1.766 4.756 *** -0.874 -1.940 * 
36 DIO 0.806 1.653 * 0.571 0.966 
36 GE 1.270 11.026 *** -0.075 -0.536 
36 INTC 1.060 3 494 *** -0.015 -0.040 
36 IRF 1.282 2.683 *** -0.167 -0.289 
36 LSI 2.019 4.292 *** -0.727 -1.274 
36 LTG 0.654 1.475 0.524 0.973 
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36 MYG 1.052 5.644 *** -0.034 -0.152 
36 NSM 1.559 3.670 *** -0.361 -0.702 
36 PKE 0.588 1.593 0.692 1.546 
36 PSI 1.250 1.525 -0.097 -0.097 
36 ROK 1.064 5.014 *** -0.233 -0.905 
36 SLR 1.740 5.082 *** 0.150 0.362 
36 TNL 1.273 2.990 *** 0.716 1.387 
36 TXN 1.311 3.893 *** 0.455 1.114 
37 CDD 0.981 4.015 *** -0.481 -1.625 
37 GR 1.026 4.913 *** -0.056 -0.223 
37 OEA 0.498 1.312 0.146 0.317 
37 TXT 0.800 5.050 *** 0.305 1.587 
37 UTX 1.046 6.133 *** 0.093 0.452 
38 BAX 0.879 4.506 *** 0.093 0.394 
38 BIO.A 0.868 3.281 *** -0.384 -1.196 
38 BOL 0.816 3.702 *** -0.143 -0.533 
38 BSX 1.562 3.957 *** -0.957 2.000 ** 
38 EK 0.992 4.216 *** -0.679 2.381 ** 
38 HAE 0.215 0.911 0.292 1.023 
38 KLAC 1.927 3.680 *** -0.120 -0.190 
38 MDT 1.255 5.639 *** -0.185 -0.684 
38 MIL 1.270 4.867 *** -0.413 -1.304 
38 SNA 0.817 4.694 *** 0.043 0.202 
38 SOL 0.902 2.157 ** 0.318 0.627 
38 SYK 1.056 3.800 *** -0.444 -1.318 
39 MVL 0.724 1.800 * 0.580 1.188 
45 DAL 0.811 3.494 *** 0.462 1.639 * 
46 KAB 1.109 3.040 *** -0.342 -0.772 
49 AES 0.502 1.561 0.514 1.317 
50 ARW 1.061 3 379 *** 0.124 0.327 
51 MAH 0.578 2.453 *** -0.049 -0.172 
58 MCD 0.672 3.594 *** -0.030 -0.134 
61 AXP 1.594 8.780 *** -0.309 -1.405 
62 BEN 1.695 6.934 *** 0.100 0.336 
62 LEH 1.680 5.699 *** 0.906 2.536 *** 
62 MER 1.877 7.616 *** 0.596 1.995 ** 
62 MWD 1.544 5.904 *** 0.826 2.605 *** 
63 AIG 1.213 7 694 *** 0.285 1.493 
73 ADSK 1.214 2.827 *** 0.486 0.933 
73 BID 0.485 1.897 * 0.915 2.952 *** 
73 CDN 1.678 4.157 *** -0.147 -0.300 
73 CDO 1.198 4 399 *** 0.355 1.075 
73 GVP 0.148 0.199 0.489 0.543 
73 INGR 0.579 L ^ 0.334 0.671 
118 
SIC SMBL BETAl ^-Statistic BETA2 f-Statistic 
^ 0.744 4.791 *** 2.722 *** 
73 MNS 0.821 2.543 ** -0.198 -0.505 
73 NOW 0.564 0.903 0.124 0.164 
73 ORCL 1.422 4.108 *** 0.122 0.290 
73 PMTC 2.137 4.590 *** -0.524 -0.928 
73 SSW 0.888 3.015 *** -0.148 -0.415 
87 TRT 0.499 0.930 -0.139 -0.214 
Panel B: Control Firms 
SIC S M B L B E T A ! 广 Statistic BETA2 ^-Statistic 
10 0.313 2.130 ** 0.385 2.156 ** 
10 GSR 0.681 0.885 -1.684 -1.805 * 
10 HL 0.154 0.371 0.441 0.878 
10 HM 0.233 0.660 -0.229 -0.534 
13 APA 0.471 1.853 * 0.114 0.369 
13 BRR 0.374 1.014 1.115 2.491 ** 
13 GLM 0.882 1.960 * 0.804 1.473 
13 KCS 0.988 2.011 ** -0.542 -0.910 
13 LD 1.013 3.332 *** 0.098 0.267 
13 RDC 1.276 2.771 *** 0.240 0.430 
13 VRI 0.516 2.174 ** -0.020 -0.069 
20 ADM 1.076 5.991 *** -0.601 -2.761 *** 
20 GIS 0.769 5.450 *** -0.423 -2.474 ** 
20 HSY 0.757 4.350 *** -0.450 -2.132 ** 
20 RAH 0.096 0.222 0.731 1.391 
23 DII 0.579 2.265 ** 0.034 0.110 
23 WAC 0.523 1.546 0.150 0.365 
26 BMS 0.881 4.536 *** 0.028 0.118 
26 W 0.801 4.641 *** -0.169 -0.808 
27 TMC 0.918 5.145 *** -0.347 -1.603 
28 ACV 0.956 5.120 *** -0.425 -1.879 * 
28 ALO 0.131 0.364 0.311 0.712 
28 AZA 0.936 4.064 *** 0.107 0.385 
28 BCU 1.138 3.049 *** -0.467 -1.033 
28 CAR 1.089 3.996 *** -0.372 -1.127 
28 CBM 0.429 1.783 * 0.220 0.755 
28 CHD 0.423 2.185 ** 0.094 0.401 
28 COB 1.438 2.757 *** 0.763 1.206 
28 FRX 1.021 3 137 *** -0.161 -0.409 
28 GGC 0.550 2.231 ** 0.016 0.052 
28 GON 0.456 1.777 * 0.227 0.730 
1 1 9 
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^ LYO 0.853 2.982 *** 0.165 0.477 
28 MRE 0.278 0.710 0.604 1.272 
28 MRX 1.464 2.559 ** -0.158 -0.228 
28 NL 0.769 1.800 * -0.450 -0.869 
28 NVX 1.057 2.049 ** -0.117 -0.187 
28 SCL 0.226 1.069 0.443 1.727 * 
28 TLZ 1.220 2.605 *** -0.298 -0.524 
28 TTI 1.172 3.106 *** -0.517 -1.129 
28 WPI 1.200 3.631 *** -0.072 -0.179 
29 ELK 0.462 2.008 ** 0.383 1.372 
29 TOS 0.697 2.536 ** 0.423 1.270 
30 ALC 0.701 3.311 *** -0.485 -1.887 * 
32 SDW 0.977 4.557 *** 0.200 0.769 
33 RLM 0.558 2.782 *** 0.214 0.879 
34 ATK 0.162 0.856 -0.064 -0.280 
34 FA 0.648 1.751 * 0.393 0.875 
34 NCS 0.210 0.585 1.079 2.481 ** 
34 RGR 0.541 2.024 ** -0.438 -1.352 
34 WYG 0.254 0.654 0.920 1.956 * 
35 ADP 0.730 4.612 *** -0.006 -0.030 
35 ALG 0.299 0.951 0.161 0.422 
35 DDC 1.247 4.279 *** -0.798 -2.257 ** 
35 DTM 0.395 0.953 0.480 0.955 
35 FEP 0.941 2.025 ** -0.228 -0.405 
35 ICP 0.674 1.603 0.421 0.825 
35 II 0.297 0.529 0.539 0.793 
35 JLG 1.488 3.114 *** -0.780 -1.346 
35 KDN 0.397 1.437 0.442 1.319 
35 MCC 0.242 1.534 0.005 0.029 
35 MPR 0.474 2.378 ** -0.104 -0.431 
35 NWK 1.582 3.417 *** -0.157 -0.279 
35 PBI 1.140 7.896 *** -0.299 -1.707 * 
35 PTC 0.699 1.593 -0.378 -0.710 
35 SEC 0.337 1.419 0.200 0.696 
35 SLS 0.460 1.612 -0.061 -0.176 
35 TEX 0.402 1.049 1.178 2.537 ** 
35 TFT 1.341 3.709 *** -0.830 -1.893 * 
36 AMK 1.068 2.293 ** -0.714 -1.265 
36 API 0.949 1.619 -1.083 -1.524 
36 AXC 1.192 1.972 ** -0.800 -1.091 
36 AZZ 0.496 1.346 0.339 0.759 
36 CGN 1.387 2.810 *** 0.313 0.523 
36 CHP 0.815 2.240 ** 0.183 0.415 
36 CHY 1.091 1.776 * -0.187 -0.251 
1 2 0 
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36 GDC 1.847 3.350 *** -0.185 -0.277 
36 IDC 1.688 3 117 *** 0.205 0.312 
36 LMS 0.491 1.329 0.342 0.764 
36 MAG 1.151 3.757 *** -0.408 -1.097 
36 RAM 0.185 0.389 0.625 1.081 
36 SL 0.810 2.574 ** 0.321 0.842 
36 SPA 0.039 0.095 0.326 0.651 
36 SVT 0.424 0.960 0.183 0.341 
36 THP 1.060 2.692 *** -0.377 -0.790 
36 UIC 0.396 1.594 0.159 0.530 
36 VSH 1.384 3.671 *** 0.234 0.511 
37 ARV 0.448 2.189 ** 0.192 0.774 
37 GY 0.606 2.462 ** 0.344 1.154 
37 MLR 0.815 1.516 -0.162 -0.249 
37 MPO 0.627 1.503 1.000 1.977 _ 
37 PCAR 0.919 3.493 術 -0.110 -0.345 
38 BMET 0.822 2.878 *** -0.089 -0.258 
38 BMI 0.128 0.389 0.206 0.518 
38 BIN 0.916 1.949 * -0.422 -0.741 
38 DRS 0.519 1.634 -0.173 -0.449 
38 FEI 0.935 2.062 ** 0.188 0.342 
38 LIT 0.617 3.383 *** -0.131 -0.593 
38 OXE 0.440 1.531 0.845 2.425 ** 
38 ROP 0.081 0.262 0.847 2.252 ** 
38 TCA 2.185 4 695 *** -0.325 -0.576 
38 THl 1.698 5.473 *** -0.045 -0.121 
38 TKN 1.785 4.648 *** -0.385 -0.827 
38 WTT 1.789 2.894 *** -0.456 -0.608 
39 BTH 1.086 2.781 *** -0.204 -0.431 
45 U 1.310 3.724 *** 0.513 1.202 
46 LHP 0.355 2.147 ** 0.024 0.118 
49 WEC 0.360 2.718 *** -0.305 -1.901 * 
50 IKN 1.897 4.043 *** -0.775 -1.362 
51 SYY 0.749 4.796 *** -0.298 -1.574 
58 VVI 0.584 2.173 ** 0.165 0.506 
61 FNM 1.527 8.104 *** -0.676 -2.959 *** 
62 AGE 1.347 5.890 *** 0.165 0.595 
62 DRC 1.663 5.767 *** -0.675 -1.931 * 
62 EV 0.542 1.944 * 0.119 0.353 
62 MOR 1.102 3.400 *** 0.200 0.508 
63 LTR 0.830 5.165 *** -0.261 -1.342 
73 ACS 0.467 1.494 0.680 1.794 * 
73 CBR 1.791 3.567 *** 0.288 0.473 
73 HX 0.734 1.810 * 0.094 0.191 
1 2 1 
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JOB 1.428 2.775 *** -1.034 -1.657 * 
73 MPS 1.873 3.523 *** -0.289 -0.448 
73 OLS 1.248 3.295 *** -0.034 -0.074 
73 PGA 1.715 4.108 *** 0.365 0.721 
73 POI 0.879 2.102 ** 0.115 0.227 
73 RHI 1.307 4.267 *** 0.318 0.855 
73 SMS 1.277 4.123 *** -0.388 -1.033 
73 TSS 0.795 2.421 ** 0.205 0.515 
73 VCI 0.335 1.249 0.530 1.626 
87 PAYX 0.957 3.064 *** -0.406 -1.074 
1 2 2 
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